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A B S T R A C T 
This study investigates the implications of the Ghana Cocoa 
Marketing Board's economic objectives on cocoa production in Ghana. 
The realisation of the Board's objectives involves it in withholding 
from the growers significant proportions of the annual proceeds from 
the export of cocoa. All withdrawals, be they temporary or permanent, 
are classified as taxes on the growers. 
The taxation since the GCMB was created is more than that 
required for optimal development of the industry. To reach this 
conclusion the actual taxation is compared with a theoretical optimum 
taxation computed along the lines suggested by Professor W. M. Corden 
of Oxford University. Thus a rationalisation of taxation in the Ghana 
cocoa industry is suggested to involve a cut in actual taxation by 
9 per cent. 
The main purpose of the thesis, which is to analyse the effect 
of the GCMB's objectives, is discussed in Chapter 5 and a broad 
spectrum of the world and Ghanaian cocoa industries is investigated. 
This, it is hoped, will provide the context in which the argument 
for optimal development of Ghanaian cocoa production is to be advanced. 
The arrangement and contents of chapters are: (a) a survey of 
the current world cocoa indxistry; (b) a survey of cocoa production and 
the resources employed in Ghana; (c) a review of some important 
attempts at estimating the Ghana cocoa supply function, and (d) the 
cocoa marketing system in Ghana. 
* Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board. 
(v) 
Chapter 1 establishes that there currently exists a favourable 
market condi tion for more cocoa to be supplied by producing nations. 
On the other hand, Chapter 2 suggests that costs of production are 
rising and that the current land and labour intensive techniques of 
production are giving way to capital intensive techniques. Chapter 3 
shows that Ghanaian cocoa producers are responsive to price incentives, 
while Chapter 4 outlines the powerful position of the GCMB and the 
objectives for which the Board stands. 
Finally, the contradictions between the Board's objectives and 
their implications for production and incomes are discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
Ghana is at an economic crossroads. Unless substantial new 
developments of initiatives are undertaken. Gross National Product will 
continue to increase at a rate slower than population increase -
meaning, at best, long term stagnation. This thesis argues for one 
such initiative: a red istribution of income to cocoa farmers. This, 
it is argued, will so increase production that government revenues will 
not fall in the long term,and increased export revenues and private 
income will provide a capital basis for a diversified approach to Ghana's 
economic development. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with a particular aspect of the develop-
ment of the Ghanaian cocoa industry - the role of the Ghana Cocoa 
Marketing Board. Since its creation in 1947 the Board has played a 
central role in the development of the industry. The Board's 
activities, particularly in the sphere of marketing, have shaped the 
industry and the performances of the Glianaian cocoa farmers. The study 
of the impact of the Board at this time is crucial because of the 
present stagnant situation in which the industry now finds itself. 
Admittedly, a significantly high rate of growth (11.4 per cent in 
1957-1965) once occurred in the industry under the Board's regime 
(see Table 1.3), but this has not been sustained. Thus, in the long 
run, the Ghanaian industry is losing ground to competitors (see Chart 2). 
The Government of Ghana is particularly worried by the fact that the 
industry did not take advantage of the boom prices of the last decade to 
share the high foreign exchange earnings that cocoa production brought 
about in other cocoa-producing countries. Furthermore, it is costly, 
as well as embarrassing, to realise that although by the International 
Cocoa Agreement (ICA) of 1972 Ghana enjoys the high voting power of 
300 out of a total of 1,000 votes, and accordingly carries the onus of 
contributing 36.7 per cent to the administrative funds of the ICA's 
budget, she finds herself producing only 27 per cent of the world's 
annual total, or rather 66| per cent of her given quota (see Appendix 
l.D). At the current production level, therefore, Ghana is financing 
the Agreement's budget for an extra 10 per cent of the world's total 
without benefiting from the implied export level. Qualified 
criticism will be made of the past endeavours of the GCMB* with regard 
to its objectives which affect production and incomes in the industry. 
1.1 THE THESIS: OBJECTIVE AND ORGANISATION 
On May 24, 1974, the Ghanaian Head of State set up a 'National 
Cocoa Committee* to investigate the bottlenecks facing the industry. 
The committee was handed a list of the following tentative problems: 
(a) The low producer prices throughout the 1960s tended 
to adversely affect farmers' incomes and farmers' 
ability to maintain their farms properly; 
(b) A relatively large proportion of cocoa trees are 
too old to yield their maximum production; 
(c) Most of the cocoa farmers themselves are too old to 
contribute their optimum effort - their average age 
is 50 years; 
(d) Widespread destruction of farms by diseases such as 
the virus, swollen shoot and capsid damage, and 
fires; 
(e) The relatively high labour costs; 
(f) The lack of sustained investment in new farms; and 
(g) The smuggling of cocoa to neighbouring countries. 
The present study does not intend to carry out the task outlined 
above for the National Cocoa Committee. Data and time constraints 
would not permit that undertaking. Instead, an attempt will be made 
to show that the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board is pursuing conflicting 
objectives. This conflict, it will be argued, is the major cause for 
* Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board. 
the lack of growth of the cocoa industry in Ghana since the early post-
independence period. 
The approach to the study will be historical, theoretical and 
empirical. Data for the analysis will come from secondary sources as 
primary data is not available. 
Although this thesis is concerned with a particular aspect of the 
development of the Ghanaian cocoa industry, the role of the Cocoa 
Marketing Board, the broad pattern of development nevertheless has to 
be considered. Accordingly, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are mainly concerned 
with the historical development of cocoa and to review the literature 
on cocoa production and marketing in Ghana. Chapter 2 traces the 
history of cocoa from its introduction to Ghana and its acceptance by 
the local farmers. Some description will also be made of the resources 
(land, labour and capital) employed in the production of cocoa. The 
relevance of this will be in the conclusion that the evidence points to 
a change in production techniques away from land and labour intensive 
towards capital intensive production. Chapter 3 surveys the more 
important literature on the production functions of Ghanaian cocoa. 
This will be in an effort to establish quantitatively the crucial 
variables which determine the supply of cocoa in Ghana. Chapter 4 
introduces the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board. Marketing systems previous 
to the Board's creation serve as a background to a more detailed 
description of the Board's role. This description will involve 
discussion of the Board's powers and objectives. The purpose of this 
will be to illustrate the degree of involvement of the GCMB in the 
cocoa industry. This leads to the conclusions formed upon the Board's 
role. Its objectives are classified and their effect upon production 
and incomes analysed in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
1.2 A DESCRIPTION OF THE COCOA INDUSTRY 
P r i o r to commencing the analysis as outlined a b o v e , a brief 
p o r t r a y a l w i l l be made of the international cocoa industry and the 
place w i t h i n it of the Ghanaian industry. S e c o n d l y , a more detailed 
description w i l l be provided of the importance of the problems to be 
discussed in this thesis. 
1.2.1 Cocoa: W o r l d Production and Consumption 
'Cocoa is produced from the fruit of "Theobroma 
Cacao L" a small spreading tree indigenous to 
tropical South A m e r i c a . ' (His Majesty's Stationery O f f i c e , 
1 9 3 8 , p.l.) 
There are several varieties of cocoa but w h e n classified into types 
they fall into two main groups - the 'Criollo' group and the 
'Forastero' group. The Criollo group produces a type of cocoa known 
as the 'fine' or 'flavour' g r a d e , while the Forastero group produces 
cocoa known as the 'ordinary' or 'base' cocoa. 
Under 15 per cent of the world's cocoa production is of the 
Criollo t y p e , mainly used to b l e n d with the base grade in the making 
of chocolate and other confectionery. Practically all cocoa grown in 
Ghana belongs to the 'Amelando' and 'Amazon' c l a s s , both sub-varieties 
of the coarser and m o r e robust Forastero group which yields only base 
cocoa (Birmingham, 1 9 6 6 , p.237). 
'Cocoa is an exacting crop and its requirements 
as regards s o i l , d r a i n a g e , rainfall and 
temperature must be met within relatively narrow 
limits if it is to do w e l l . ' (His Majesty's 
Stationery O f f i c e , 1938.) 
For i n s t a n c e , the plant w i l l not flourish in a climate where temperature 
* 
and rainfall are below 60°F and 45 inches respectively (Urquhart, 1955). 
Urquhart's b o o k gives detailed information on the climatic 
conditions in many different cocoa growing areas. 
Favourable conditions for cocoa should include protection against 
drying winds. The method of planting is either by seeds sown at stake, 
by transplanting seedlings from a nursery, or by clonal cuttings as 
practised on research stations. The crop is borne in pods attached to 
the trunk and thicker branches by short stocks. 
'Each pod contains a mass of some 20 to 40 seeds 
arranged in rows and covered in a white pulp.' 
(His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938) 
The seeds are extracted from the pod, fermented with the pulp and dried 
to become the beans of commerce (Rohan, 1963). Usually cocoa trees 
come into bearing from three to five years after planting. 
In commercial use, cocoa beans are first cleaned, roasted and 
shelled and then ground into a liquid mass called liquor. The liquor is 
then either used directly in the manufacture of chocolate confectioneries 
and biscuits or pressed to yield two separate products, cocoa powder and 
cocoa butter. Cocoa butter is combined with chocolate liquor in the 
manufacture of the lighter varieties of chocolate, while cocoa drinks 
are produced from the cocoa powder (Weymar, 1968). 
Cocoa is harvested twice a year. In Ghana, the crop harvested 
between September and January is the larger of the two harvests, and is 
accordingly called the 'main crop'. The smaller harvest, called the 
'mid crop', is done between April and June. Outside West Africa the 
time for harvest and sale of the crop varies from country to country. 
For instance, it is known that the Brazilian crop normally reaches the 
world markets slightly before the Ghana and other West African crops 
and its peak exports occur usually between October and March. Also, in 
the Dominican Republic exports reach their peak between May and July. 
But in Trinidad the peak is between February and May; while in Equador 
and Venezuela, between April and June. The months of heaviest arrivals 
of all cocoa on the world markets is observed to coincide roughly 
with the Ghanaian and Nigerian exporting season. Accordingly, October 
1 to September 30 is taken, for statistical purposes, to be the cocoa 
crop year (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938). 
Cocoa cultivation dates back as far as the time of the Aztec 
civilization. Nevertheless, total world production remained 
insignificant compared with today's production figures until the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Total world export of cocoa was about 
77,000 metric tonnes in 1895, as reported by the Nowell Commission of 
1937. The main producing countries in 1895 in descending order were: 
Equador, the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Venezuela. These, together, 
exported about 73 per cent of the world total. Sao Thome, which 
exported about 9 per cent of the total, was the single significant 
source of supply outside Latin America (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938) 
Ghana exported cocoa for the first time in 1891. It was only 80 lb. 
In 1895 her export of cocoa was 12 metric tonnes. However, by 1919, 
world export of cocoa had quadrupled, and in 1925 a figure of 500,000 
metric tonnes was exceeded (see Appendix l.A). This remarkable increase 
over a comparatively short period was made possible by the extension of 
cocoa cultivation to West Africa and by the very rapid growth of 
production, especially in Ghana. Ghana alone contributed nearly 44 per 
cent in 1925, and Ghana and Nigeria, together, contributed about 52 per 
cent of the world total (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938, p.6). 
Thus, within twenty years, the centre of cocoa production had 
shifted from south and central America to West Africa. But while the 
centres of production of the cocoa bean shifted from America to Africa, 
the market for cocoa shifted in an opposite direction from Europe to 
America. Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 show the shifts in production and 
consumption between 1900 and 1950. 
TABLE 1.1 
WORLD COCOA BEAN PRODUCTION BY CONTINENT, 1909-1949 
(Percentage Distribution and Total Exports) 
Year 
North and 
Central America 
(%) 
South 
America 
(%) 
Africa 
(%) 
Asia 
(%) 
Oceania 
(%) 
TOTAL 
('000 tonnes) 
1909 - 13 23 39 35 2.5 0.5 2 36 
1914 - 18 21 35 41 2.0 1.0 314 
1919 - 23 15 30 53 1.5 0.5 431 
1924 - 28 12 23 62 1.5 1.0 523 
1929 - 33 11 23 64 1.0 0.5 587 
19 34 - 38 9 24 66 0.5 0.5 732 
19 39 - 43 8 26 65 0.5 0.5 634 
1944 - 48 8 25 66 0.5 0.5 655 
1949 - 51 8 26 65 0.5 0.5 775 
Source: FAO (1952) 
TABLE 1.2 
WORLD IMPORTATION OF COCOA, 1909-1949 
(Percentage Distribution) 
Year 
Continental 
Europe 
(%) 
United 
Kingdom 
(%) 
U.S.A. 
(%) 
Canada 
(%) 
All 
Others 
(%) 
1909 - 13 58 12 26 1 3 
1926 - 30 44 12 38 2 5 
1935 - 39 40 16 39 2 3 
1940 - 44 15 26 48 4 7 
1945 - 49 24 19 45 3 9 
Source; Wickizer (1951). 
Figure 1.1, in which quantities of Ghana and world cocoa 
production and prices have been plotted for the period 1919-20 to 
1973-74, shows that both the world's and Ghana's production have 
expanded considerably, though not in equal proportions since the end 
of World War I. Coincidentally, their rate of growth was identical 
at 3.5 per cent for the entire period between World Wars I and II. 
But since World War II the two rates of growth have differed 
significantly (see Table 1.3 below). Nevertheless, the overall 
expansion of the world cocoa supply from about a quarter of a million 
metric tonnes in 1920 to over one and a half million metric tonnes in 
1970 does not mean that growth was smooth. The extreme variability of 
cocoa production can be observed from the patterns on the production 
graphs. This variability is attributable to the crop's extreme 
sensitivity to climatic conditions, diseases and pests. It also has a 
relatively long and variable gestation period between planting and 
harvesting. But more complex still is the functional relationship 
TABLE 1.3 
GROWTH RATE OF GHANA AND WORLD COCOA PRODUCTION, 1919-1974 
Period Ghana (%) 
World 
(%) 
1919-20 - 1936-37 +3.5 +3.5 
1937-38 - 1946-47 -3.0 -2.0 
1947-48 - 1956-57 +0.04 +2.7 
1957-58 - 1964-65 +11.4 +7.7 
1965-66 - 1973-74 +0.01 +2.0 
Source: Computed from Appendix l.A 
between supply and price. Ady (1949) et al., has shown that cocoa 
supply is responsive to price variations, while Weymar (1968) has 
established that the price of cocoa is, in turn, responsive to supply 
changes. These two inferences can be drawn from Figure 1.1. For 
example, when world production declined in 1926-27, 1947-48, 1957-58 
and 1968-69, the price movement for those periods was upwards. But 
the opposite was also true in 19 34-35 and 1964-65. The long-run 
expansion of the industry has been characterised by short term 
fluctuations caused by the short term factors of climate, diseases, 
pests, lags and cocoa prices. 
Four distinct periods of growth can be discerned in the long-run 
world production of cocoa. First, 1920-21 to 1938-39 was a period of 
steady growth of about 3.5 per cent per annum. As we have observed, 
this was largely due to the further extension of cocoa production to 
the low cost regions of West Africa. Secondly, supplies decreased 
markedly during the war (1939-40 to 1947-48). 
10,000 tonnes 
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World War II switched demand away from commodities like cocoa. 
Consequently cocoa prices fell and provided no incentive for new 
plantings, good husbandry, etc., which contributed to the further 
spread of cocoa diseases, hence the decline in production. Alternative 
employment in food and military goods production, signalled by rising 
prices in those markets, even drew on existing and potential factors of 
cocoa production. There was, in addition, an outbreak of cocoa 
diseases in the 1940s and 1950s, e.g., the swollen shoot disease which 
kills cocoa trees in about two years; Blackpod disease, a type of 
fungi which attacks the cocoa pod; Witches-Broom, also a fungus 
prevalent in South America; Monilia disease; Mealypod disease; Diplodia 
pod-rot; and the capsid, Cocoa-Thrips and Mealybugs, these last three 
being pests which carry viruses that destroy cocoa trees and pods. 
Swollen shoot, the most devastating cocoa disease in West Africa was 
first spotted in 1936 but it only became very serious during and after 
the war years. 
The effects of all the three factors in the supply situation 
during this period are summarised in Figure 1.2. It is assumed that 
S S is the supply curve before the Second World War (1939-45); D D o o ^^ ' o o 
is the demand curve for cocoa in that period. P and Q are the o o 
corresponding equilibrium price and supply levels of cocoa, respectively. 
When World War II began in 1939, the demand for cocoa fell, illustrated 
by a shift of D D to D^D,. The equilibrium price fell from P P, , as ^ o o l l o l 
did equilibrium quantity from Q^ to Q^. Furthermore, the additional 
combined effects of the ravaging diseases and the appearance of more 
profitable alternative sources of employment, which implied higher real 
and opportunity costs of production, also pushed S^S^ to S^S^. The new 
equilibrium quantity fell ultimately to OQ^. It was no wonder that 
the price of cocoa rose in the early 1950s to levels well beyond those 
12 
FIGURE 1.2 
WORLD COCOA SUPPLY AND DEMAND SITUATION, 1939-1954 
Price 
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reached prior to the Second World War, which we assumed to be P in the 
o 
illustration above. 
When demand returned to normal (D^D^) in the 1950s, the slow growth 
of production shown by OQ^ and OQ^ caused cocoa prices to shoot up 
further to the record high of P^. In actual terms it was 54 (US) cents 
per pound in 1954. The third distinctive period was 1948-49 to 1956-59 
which was a time of slow growth in production. Cocoa diseases continued 
to check production while political agitation for independence in both 
Ghana and Nigeria, which together contributed about 50 per cent of the 
world total, further slowed down the growth in the period. Finally, 
1958-59 to 1974 was a period of generally high growth. During this 
period there occurred a technological break-through in cocoa disease 
control and cocoa culture, coupled with an expansion in the world 
consumption of cocoa due to rising affluence in both Eastern and 
Western economies (see Appendix l.C). Demand, therefore, became fairly 
strong and so maintained a high average price for cocoa, which, in turn, 
encouraged increases in supplies during the period. 
WORLD CONSUMPTION OF COCOA 
Statistics on world consumption of cocoa are not readily 
published by manufacturers, thus good estimates of the true world 
consumption of cocoa for the entire period 1919 to 1974 are hard to 
obtain. However, figures have been compiled for the whole period and 
are shown in column 3 of Appendix l.B, as well as on a graph in Figure 
1.1. More reliance can be placed on the accuracy of the post—World 
War II data. 
An important point revealed by the supply and consumption graphs 
is that there has occurred an enormous growth in the total world supply 
of cocoa but consumption has only kept up, but at declining and wildly 
fluctuating prices (early 1950s to late 1960s). Only since about 
14 
1967-68 has the trend been reversed but it is difficult to say whether 
the recent extraordinary high prices indicate anything more than another 
wild gyration. 
Given the low price elasticity of demand for cocoa (estimated to 
be about -0.3) but a reasonably high income elasticity of demand (of 
about 0.7 to 0.8), the future profitability of the industry is closely 
related to population and income growth in the consuming countries and 
the acquisition of the taste for cocoa products by new consumers out-
side the traditional markets. However, as in 1946, the immediate 
problem would appear to be the necessity of increasing supplies. 
With the current world price of cocoa ranging above 100 (US) cents 
for the first time (and for several months), it highlights the 
acuteness of the shortages in supplies, notwithstanding the fact that 
the present level of supply is about 100 per cent above any of the 
annual supplies prior to the 1960s. It was in similar circumstances 
of escalating consumption and prices that at the International Cocoa 
Conference held in London as long ago as October 1946, and attended 
by representatives of the main cocoa product manufacturers, the 
following resolution was adopted: 
'The Conference expresses the belief that the world demand 
for raw cocoa exceeds the available supply and attaches 
urgency to the increasing of supplies, and is of the 
opinion that any efficient new production which may be 
practicable for the next twenty-five years in existing or 
new areas will be absorbed at a fair price to the grower.' 
(Urquhart, 1955, p.172) 
The above resolution is over a quarter of a century old, and the 
world cocoa producers have been reassured once again by a similar 
resolution of the same body; this time backed by the United Nations in 
the form of the International Cocoa Agreement which became operative 
in 1973. In this new agreement 22 and 32 (US) cents per pound were set 
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as floor and celling prices for cocoa, respectively. It Is worthy of 
note that after barely a year of operation the Agreement has lifted 
the floor price from 22 to 28 (US) cents per pound in order to persuade 
producers to produce more to relieve the world of the tight supply 
situation. 
Having pointed out that a favourable economic climate existed 
during the past decade and is likely to remain, attention is now 
turned to cocoa production in Ghana - the world's largest single 
producer of cocoa. 
1.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF COCOA TO GHANA 
Cocoa is overwhelmingly important to Ghana's economy. In 1900 cocoa 
became the country's most important export crop and is likely to remain 
so for a long time. The contribution of cocoa to the economy of Ghana 
can be readily recognised in the following areas. 
Cocoa consistently contributes over 60 per cent of Ghana's total 
annual foreign exchange earnings. Table 1.4, below, shows this 
phenomenon. Furthermore, it provides employment for about 18 per cent 
of Ghana's labour force, as shown in Table 1.5. The details of the 
structure of the labour force absorbed by the industry will be discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
Being the employer of such a significant proportion of the labour 
force, cocoa certainly is a major source of purchasing power to both 
the private sector and government alike. Table 1.6 shows the aggregate 
cash incomes accruing to the nation, the farmers and to the government. 
Activities in the industry also contribute substantially to the 
Gross Domestic Product and capital stock of Ghana. In fact, the 
Ghanaian cocoa industry has been described as 'a huge accumulation of 
TABLE 1.4 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF VALUE OF EXPORTS OF DOMESTIC PRODUCE IN OlANA, 1962-69 
CoTTmiodity 
1962 
(%) 
1963 
(%) 
1964 
(%) 
1965 
(%) 
1966 
(%) 
1967 
(%) 
1968 
(%) 
1969 
(%) 
Cocoa Beans and 
Cocoa Products* 63.3 66.7 64.8 66.6 62.3 64.9 63.6 62.9 
Timber 11.0 12.1 13.0 11.0 11.3 9 . 3 8 .5 10.0 
Bauxite 0.6 0 .5 0 .6 0 .6 0 . 8 0 .7 0 . 4 0 . 4 
Manganese 4.9 3.7 3.8 4 .3 6 .5 3.9 3.2 1 .8 
Diamonds 6.7 3.1 5 .4 6 .1 5 .8 5 .3 5 .2 3 .5 
Gold 10.1 10.7 9 .1 8.5 9 .2 8 .7 6 .6 7.6 
Kola Nuts 1.3 0 .8 0 .3 0 .3 0 .7 0 .2 0 . 1 0 .2 
Others 2 .1 2.0 3.5 2.6 3.4 7.0 10.6 13.6 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ghana Economic Survey, , 1969. 
* Cocoa products refer to cocoa paste , cocoa cake and cocoa butter. 
C3N 
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TABLE 1.5 
GHANA LABOUR FORCE AND PERCENTAGE ABSORBED BY THE COCOA INDUSTRY 
Year Total Labour Force (1) 
Employed in Cocoa Industry 
(2) 
(2) as % of (1) 
1956 2,438,242 448,954 18.4 
1957 2,506,532 454,414 18.1 
1958 2,576,684 454,878 17.7 
1959 2,648,860 454,550 17.2 
1960 2.723,026 521,642 19.2 
1961 2,804,392 540,961 19.3 
1962 2,888,193 538,678 18.7 
1963 2,974,499 546,096 18.4 
1964 3,063,384 572,450 18.7 
1965 3,154,929 576,217 18.3 
1966 3,251,193 515,774 15.9 
1967 3,350,393 517,124 15.4 
1968 3,452,623 556,674 16.1 
1969 3,452,697 552,888 16.0 
Source: Ghana Economic Bulletin, Vol. 2 (1972). 
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TABLE 1 . 6 
AGGREGATE COCOA PROCEEDS ACCRUING TO FARMERS 
AND THE GOVERNMENT AS PURCHASING POWER 
Year 
Cocoa proceeds 
to Ghana 
N(?M 
Aggregate income 
from cocoa 
to farmers 
NCM 
Duty on cocoa 
accruing to 
government 
N<:M 
1958/1959 141 .8 67 .4 52 .4 
1959/1960 139 .8 71 .0 52 .6 
1960/1961 143 .2 96 . 8 49 .4 
1961/1962 138 .0 82 .6 55 .0 
1962/1963 138 .2 84 .0 55 .2 
1963/1964 153 .8 84 .8 43 .4 
1964/1965 136 115.0 33 .8 
1965/1966 136 61 .2 N.A. 
1966/1967 103 63.9 N.A. 
1967/1968 125 100.9 N.A. 
1968/1969 186 88 .5 85 .0 
1969/1970 231 112.2 113 .5 
1970/1971 300 112.5 117.5 
Source: Compiled from Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board Reports 
(1947-1965) and Manu (1973) . 
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capital created, on the basis of specially favourable natural resources, 
by converting human labour into capital assets over the years needed to 
clear the bush, to plant cocoa trees and to bring the farm to the age 
of bearing' (Birmingham, 1966, p.192). The capital value of cocoa can 
be estimated on the basis of the expected net earnings (export earnings 
less local services and labour cost) which would accrue to the economy 
from the present acreage of cocoa. Table 1.7 shows the percentage share 
of cocoa to the Gross Domestic Product and capital stock of Gliana. The 
present value is the expected future flow of cocoa proceeds discounted 
by interest rate assumed to be 7 per cent by Tony Killick (Birmingham, 
1966), in the calculation of Table 1.7. 
The direction of Ghana's cocoa trade is depicted by Appendix l.C. 
This direction is basically stable and towards the Western economies 
but it is showing signs of diversification into Eastern economies of 
late. The Western economies take up between 70 and 95 per cent of the 
entire annual output. However, the assumption by the Eastern 
economies have risen from 1.2 to about 29 per cent between 1947 and 
1970. 
Notwithstanding the great contribution cocoa makes to the 
Ghanaian economy. Table 1.8, below, shows that Ghana's share of the 
world cocoa bean production has a general trend of decline. Figure 
1.3 depicts the decline; the constant slope of the declining trend 
line indicates an increasing rate of decline along the line AB. 
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TABLE 1.7 
CONTRIBUTION OF COCOA TO THE GDP AND CAPITAL STOCK 
IN GHAM, 1955-1961 
Year GDP 
N<;M 
Cocoa as 
% of GDP 
Capital and stock 
at mid-year 
NCM 
Cocoa as 
a % of 
capital stock 
1955 710 12,4 1558 30.5 
1956 752 14.1 1688 30.4 
1957 776 12.9 1770 28.5 
1958 764 11.0 1880 27.8 
1959 866 14.5 2030 27.7 
1960 938 16.0 2328 31.0 
1961 952 15.0 2592 32.1 
Source: Birmingham (ed.). Vol. I (1966). 
TABLE 1 .8 
SHARES OF WORLD COCOA PRODUCTION 
(Percentage) 
Country 
1934/35-
1938/39 
(%) 
1954/55-
1958/59 
(%) 
1964/65-
1968/69 
(%) 
1969/70-
1973/74 
(%) 
- 1974/75 * 
(%) 
Africa 66.6 62.2 72.4 72.3 72.8 
Ghana 38.4 28.7 31.9 28.0 27.6 
Nigeria 13.1 13.5 17.5 17.7 18.6 
Ivory Coast 6.8 7.4 10.4 13.3 12.2 
Cameroon 3.6 7.0 6.6 7.6 9.0 
South America 23.6 27.4 18.9 19.0 18.6 
Brazil 17.7 19.6 11.5 12.3 12.0 
Central America 8.6 8.9 5.7 5.6 5.1 
Asia 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Oceania 0.4 0.9 2.0 2.5 2.9 
Papua N.A. 0.4 1.6 2.1 2.4 
Source: Computed from Appendix 
* IBRD Estimates. 
l.A. 
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CONCLUSION 
The preservation of a privileged position of high international 
quotas makes a compelling argument for increased Ghanaian production 
of cocoa. But this is not the only reason; one other reason is the 
foreign exchange constraint upon the Ghanaian economy. The eventual 
consequence of a stagnation or a decline in cocoa receipts would mean 
aggravated balance of payment difficulties for Ghana. For since 
cocoa changed the mineral-based export economy to an agricultural 
produce-dominant export economy there has been no further diversification 
from this mono-crop export dependence (Szereszewski, 1965). This had 
already become a subject for concern by the end of World War I, but 
successive development plans and planners (Lewis, Domar, et al.) have 
not been able to substantially alter the imbalance. Cocoa therefore 
remains the only important internal source of development finance for 
the Ghanaian economy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COCOA PRODUCTION IN GHANA 
2.0 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
When, exactly, cocoa was first introduced into Ghana, and by whom, 
is uncertain. Some of the literature on the subject claims that cocoa 
was first introduced into the Gold Coast, now Ghana, in 1859 by the 
Basel Mission. Experimental stations were said to have been set up at 
Akropong and Akwapim by this mission, but they were beset with failure. 
A single tree, however, survived and in 1866 bore fifteen pods from 
which seedlings were produced and distributed to other mission stations 
at Aburi, Mampong and Krobo Odumasi (Wanner, 1962, p.14). 
Other parts of the literature on cocoa in Ghana also claim that 
Sir William B. Griffith, Governor of the Gold Coast, imported cocoa pods 
from Sao Thome in 1886 and started the nursery at Aburi from which 
seedlings were supplied to local farmers. Under his direction, 
scientific information on cocoa cultivation was also published for the 
guidance of the farmers. 
But still contrary to the above claims is the nationalist one that 
cocoa was first introduced into Ghana by a Ghanaian, Tetteh Quarshie, in 
whose honour national monuments, like the Tetteh Quarshie Memorial 
Hospital, now stand in the country. In the words of the NoweU Commission 
in 1938: 
'The history of the cocoa industry in the Gold Coast is 
covered by the memories of the older men who are still 
engaged in it. Its beginning is popularly attributed 
to one Tetteh Quarshie, a Fanti labourer in the cocoa 
plantations of Fernado Po, who in 1879 returned to 
Mampong with a smuggled cocoa pod. He is evidently 
destined to be a national hero, and we were somewhat 
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embarrassed by the tendency of native witnesses to insist 
on beginning with this already somewhat legendary figure.' 
(His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938) 
A plausible synthesis of the above claims, as can be readily 
inferred from the works of Dickson (1966) and the NowelLCommission (His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938), is that the Basel Mission first 
introduced cocoa cultivation into Ghana in 1859, but whatever local 
interest that was generated disappeared between 1868 and 1873 when 
Akwapim and Krobo, the main experimental districts, were subjected to 
Ashanti invasions. Tetteh Quarshie reintroduced it in 1879 and 
successfully popularised it amongst the local farmers. The wide 
interest of the farmers gained the attention of the government which 
demonstrated its support through the distribution of seeds and scientific 
information from the Aburi Gardens in 1887. 
At any rate, the importance of the tripartite controversy over 
when, and by whom cocoa was first introduced into Ghana belongs to 
advocates of christian, colonial and nationalist interests, respectively. 
Hence, it will receive no further attention in this economically-
oriented study. 
Of importance to this study was the response of the local farmers 
to the introduction of cocoa culture. Their response was amazing. 
Various authors described this economic spectacle in the following way: 
'Once the cocoa industry was established it expanded at a 
phenomenal rate . . . . Seldom has any industry in any 
part of the world expanded so quickly.' 
(J.C. de Graft Johnson, 1958, p.49) 
'The speed with which cocoa cultivation spread in 
Southern Ghana was spectacular: by 1895 the cocoa tree 
was to be seen in almost every part of Southern Ghana.' 
(K.B. Dickson, 1966, p.166) 
'This development [12 tonnes in 1892-1896 to 256,033 tonnes 
in 1932-1936] remarkable enough in bare figures, may well 
be described as phenomenal when it is explained to be the 
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sum of the production of small native farms, mostly of 
one to five acres.' 
Novell Commission (His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1938, p.16) 
Table 2.1, below, shows comparative development of the industry 
in Ghana and Nigeria. Nigeria is currently the second largest cocoa 
producer after Ghana. 
TABLE 2.1 
COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF COCOA PRODUCTION BETWEEN GHANA AND NIGERIA 
Year 
Average Annual Export 
(tonnes) 
Ghana Nigeria 
1892-1893 12 32 
1897-1901 329 144 
1902-1906 4,711 462 
1907-1911 20,934 2,375 
1912-1916 58,306 6,002 
1917-1921 118,290 17,294 
1922-1926 205,858 37,017 
1927-1931 225,732 49,749 
1932-1936 256,033 75,690 
Source: His Majesty's Stationery Office (1938), p.16. 
2.1 FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCED RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF COCOA PRODUCTION 
A combination of factors favoured the rapid development of cocoa 
production in Ghana. Broadly, they fall into three categories: 
ecological, economic and social. 
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2.1.1 Ecological Factors 
The forest region of Ghana where cocoa was introduced is particularly 
suited to cocoa cultivation. The soil type is of the typical ochrosols, 
which under a light, well-distributed rainfall, has been subjected to 
little leaching (Urquhart, 1955). It is of good physical condition and 
water-holding capacity and hence does not dry out but remains well 
drained even in the wettest period of the year. The cocoa plant 
establishes itself readily on the upper level of the catena from the mid-
slope upwards, virtually as a secondary growth replacing the original 
forest under-growth and, once established, is maintained by periodic 
slashing of the regrowth. Thus, even under primitive methods of 
cultivation, attempts at cocoa production were successful and the free 
market for cocoa flourished. Relatively little effort, skill and capital 
was required in cocoa production as compared to that required in the 
cultivation of rubber, palm oil and coffee. 
2.1.2 Economic Factors 
(i) Fall in the price of traditional crops - The downward 
movement since the 1890s of the prices of palm oil, coffee and rubber, 
the main cash crops before the advent of cocoa, caused a dramatic review 
of traditional attitudes in favour of cocoa production. For example, 
between 1884 and 1886 the price of palm oil fell from £24 per tonne to 
£12 per tonne and did not recover beyond £14 per tonne for about twenty 
years thereafter. The price of coffee also slumped in 1898 only to be 
followed by the fall in the price of rubber in 1902. But while the 
prices of these older crops were declining, the price of the new crop, 
cocoa, was on the ascent, reaching an average of nearly £50 per tonne 
in 1900. 
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Thus, with the rising price of cocoa, which was also relatively 
cheaper to produce (see Appendix 2.A) the farmers who were beset with 
the declining prices of their traditional exports, hastened to transfer 
their resources into the production of the new crop. 
(ii) Government economic support - Infrastructural support 
such as transport facilities, distribution of seeds and scientific 
information on cocoa production, and marketing arrangements, was provided 
by the government and should be counted among the factors which aided 
the rapid growth of the Ghanaian cocoa industry. 
The Report of the Agricultural Department for 1895 stated that many 
Africans from considerable distances visited the Government Botanical 
Gardens at Aburi to obtain information 'and after being instructed how 
to cure coffee and cocoa they have gone away delighted and vetry grateful 
for the information received'. 
Three years later (1898) the Governor, F. M. Hodgson, 
established the first official cocoa marketing scheme in Ghana. The 
government, under the scheme, was willing to pay half the assumed value 
(less freight and other charges) of any cocoa brought by planters to 
Aburi and the rest, if any, was paid to the producer after the cocoa 
had been sold abroad. The reason for introducing the scheme was mainly 
that it was thought that 'expensive machinery' would be required to 
prepare the crop for export. Moreover, part of the farmer's financial 
needs would be met so as to save him from extortion by money lenders. 
By 1899 a total of 433,400 seedlings had been sold from the Aburi 
Gardens to farmers. 
Before the building of railways, transportation costs were the 
single largest component in the industry. Individual producers of cocoa 
could transport their produce to the coast for shipment only by head. 
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or by rolling them in barrels. The disadvantages of this were that it 
was wasteful of manpower in cocoa production in view of the limited 
population, and it was ruinously expensive in cash and time. 
Illustration of head-transportation costs: 
One tonne cocoa equals 37 loads of 60 lb each; 
one head load requires one man to carry, 
therefore, 37 men are required to carry one tonne cocoa. 
One day's journey equals 15 miles, 
therefore, 37 man days are required to transport 
one tonne for 15 miles. 
Cost per carrier per day equals Is. 6d. with load; 
cost per carrier per day equals 6d. without load. 
Total cost per tonne per day equals £3. 14s. 6d. 
or. 
Total cost per tonne per mile equals 5s. (Kay, 1972, p.160). 
A comparison between cost of head, road and rail transportation is 
given in Table 2.2, below: 
TABLE 2.2 
TRANSPORTATION COSTS 
Transport 
(per tonne/mile) Cost 
Head 5s. to 6s. 
Lorry 2s. 9d. 
Rail: first 50 miles 7^d, 
second 50 miles 6d. 
third 50 miles AJd, 
fourth 50 miles 3d. 
Source: Kay (1972). 
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2.1.3 Sociological Factors 
The high degree of mobility of labour in Ghana and for that matter 
West Africa in general, also contributed in no small measure to the 
establishment of cocoa in Ghana. 
The Akwapims of the Eastern Region of Ghana, the pioneer cocoa 
growers, migrated far and wide into Ashanti and the western region of the 
country in search of virgin land to establish cocoa farms. In the process 
of migration they spread the knowledge of cocoa cultivation to farmers in 
the other parts of the forest region. Meanwhile, other citizens of 
Northern Ghana, Northern Togoland and Upper Volta, who have no comparable 
cash crops like rubber, palm oil, coffee and cocoa, etc., migrated into 
Southern Ghana after their seasonal food crop cultivation in October each 
year to sell their labour on the cash crop farms. Faced with the pressure 
to pay their taxes and the constraint of time to return to their food crop 
farms at the beginning of the rainy season in April, they constituted a 
cheap source of labour to the cocoa farmers, particularly in Ashanti: 
'The remarkable growth of the cocoa industry in Ashanti is 
due in a large measure, to labour supplied from the Northern 
Territories [of Ghana]. The Ashanti never an agriculturalist, 
is only too pleased to pay the native of the Northern 
Territories from Is. to 2s. 3d. per diem, in addition to his 
food, in exchange for his work on the cocoa farms.' , 
(Hill, 1956, p.106) 
1. Further details on the contribution of migration to the develop-
ment of the Ghana cocoa industry may be obtained by consulting 
His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938, pp.193-195; Hill, 1963. 
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2.2 CONDITIONS OF CULTIVATION 
2.2.1 General Sequence of Activities 
The critical path for cocoa production differs in detail from 
country to country and also from region to region in a single country. 
Much depends upon the level of agronomic technology and the social 
tradition of the cocoa-producing country. The type of forest and the 
landscape to be planted with cocoa also affects the critical path. 
In general, however, Urquhart (1955), who has had a long and wide 
experience on cocoa culture in Africa, Latin America and Asia, suggested 
a general sequence of activities, which are summarised below. Indeed, 
much of the rest of this chapter will be heavily drawn from the expert 
information of Urquhart, who spent nearly a quarter of a century in 
the Colonial Agricultural Service in Nigeria and Ghana. 
1. Preliminary preparation; 
- choice of site 
soil assessment 
communication and water supply assessment 
- type of planting materials; seeds or cuttings. 
2. Preparation of land; 
clearing: complete felling 
selective thinning 
partial clearance. 
3. Nurseries: 
- site selection 
shade and shelter 
- planting seed, baskets, etc. 
- supply and treatment of nursery plants. 
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4. Planting and after care; 
- planting at stake 
- planting from nursery beds 
- planting with baskets 
weeding, shaping and pruning 
- pest and disease control. 
5. Preparation of crop for market; 
harvesting 
fermentation 
- drying and storage. 
A detailed discussion of the above summary may be found in Rohan (1963) 
and Urquhart (1955). 
2.2.2 Conditions of Cultivation in Ghana 
Cocoa farmers in Ghana practice the sequence of activities 
summarised above but in their own unique way. Unlike in the plantation 
systems of Latin America and Asia, the Ghanaian cocoa farmer normally 
plants the cocoa on his food crop farm. Urquhart observed that in Ghana 
the farmer's methods of planting cocoa are his own, evolved by himself 
and that they differ in many respects from what is considered good 
plantation practice elsewhere. To establish a cocoa farm, a piece of 
forest is cut down and burnt, after which the land is planted in food 
crops (cocoyam, plantain, cassava) with cocoa interplanted. The 
operations of weeding and cultivation supplied to the land under food 
crop benefits the young cocoa plant and enables it to establish itself 
before the food farm is abandoned. The cocoyams, plantains, bananas 
and possibly cassava, provide the necessary ground cover for the young 
cocoa tree in its initial stages. The larger trees which are left 
standing either because they proved too formidable to cut down, or 
because the farmer liked them, provide shade for his cocoa trees. 
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The simplicity of some of the methods of planting cocoa employed 
by the West African farmer, in general, Urquhart says, has surprised 
experienced planters elsewhere. The West Africans plant two or three 
seeds two or three inches apart at a stand, by just opening the sur-
face of the cultivated soil enough to allow them to insert the seeds. 
When planting in baskets, they make a hole sufficiently large to 
accommodate the basket. Having at first no knowledge of the optimum 
soil requirement of cocoa they adopted a method of trial and error until 
they arrived at a satisfactory response. 
The Ghanaian and other West Africans, alike, plant cocoa at close 
and irregular spacing of about 3 to 5 feet, unlike the 12 feet by 12 feet 
in Sri Lanka; 15 feet by 15 feet in New Guinea and Samoa, and 3 by 
3 metres in Zaire. Close spacing of 3 to 5 feet has been found to be 
useful, for even when a number of trees have died there are still plenty 
left to provide a canopy which covers and protects the ground from the 
sun (see Appendix 2.B). A close canopy also has the great value that 
the trees are less liable to attack by capsid bugs. The Cocoa Marketing 
Board and the Ministry of Agriculture are urging the farmers to plant 
in straight lines and leave sufficient space to allow operators of 
dusting and spraying machines to move between them. 
2.3 RESOURCES EMPLOYED 
Much is known of the system of land alienation, the structure of 
the cocoa labour force and the type of capital employed in Ghana's 
cocoa production. 
2.3.1 Land Resources 
The total area suitable for cocoa cultivation as estimated in 1922 
was about 20,000 sqiiare miles, or about 12,800,000 acres (Kay, 1972, 
p.117), but the estimated land actually under cocoa in 1964 was about 
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4 , 2 24 , 2 77 acres and regionally distributed as in Table 2 . 3 , below: 
TABLE 2 . 3 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF LAND UNDER COCOA, 1964 
Region Acres 
Ashanti 1 , 580 , 635 
Brong Ahofo 1 , 003 , 992 
Eastern 549 ,201 
Central 424,333 
Western 317,653 
Volta 348,463 
TOTAL 4 , 224 ,277 
Source: Birmingham ( e d . ) , ( 1966) , Vol. 1 , p .237 . 
Land Tenure - Kinship, reverence for ancestors and belief in the 
spiritual powers of the earth combined to give land tenure in the Akan-
dominated cocoa growing area its present peculiar characteristics. 
The earth was regarded as possessing a spirit or power of its own which 
was helpful if properly propitiated and harmful if neglected. But the 
land was also regarded as belonging to the ancestors. It was from the 
ancestors that the living had inherited the right to use the land. It 
was also believed that the ancestors kept watch and saw to it that the 
land was used properly (Dodoo, 1971, p . 6 7 ) . Those living in the Ghana 
cocoa belt , therefore, are only holding tenancies at the will of the 
dead. Land thus belongs to the family and, as villages come into 
existence, the family land belonged to the village or communal land 
system. Cocoa farmers accordingly have been well known for their 
reluctance to sell land, especially to strangers. They would rather 
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lease for cash payments or otherwise, but not to sell permanently. A 
very important compromise was developed in an attempt to cater for the 
demands of tradition and the modern cash economy. This is known as 
the 'Land Pledging' system. By this system, a cocoa farmer in need of 
money pledges his land for the required sum; while, on the other hand, a 
farmer in need of land finds a counterpart who is prepared to pledge 
his land to him. The farm provides the lender with security for the 
debt and the usufruct provides the borrower with the means of repayment 
of the capital and interest on the loan. Pledging a piece of land often 
involves a written form of agreement mostly drawn up by local letter 
writers. The pledged land reverts automatically back to the pledgee 
when the debt has been paid up. Polly Hill (1956) has treated 
extensively the land alienation system in the Ghana cocoa belt and her 
study makes interesting reading. 
It is worthy to note, however, that although tradition holds 
strong and that pledging is popular, successful bidders have bought 
(and are still buying) land in the cocoa region. Their success, however, 
depends, to some extent, upon whether one is a kinsman or a well known 
friend of the village. The odds against a virtual stranger in the land 
market are very great. His only chance lies in the pledging system. 
However, this tenurial system results in many problems, amongst which 
litigation among pledging parties is the most notorious and wasteful 
of time and cash resources. Table 2.4, below, shows the rising trend 
in land prices since 1900. 
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TABLE 2.4 
ESTIMATED COST OF LAND FOR COCOA, 1900-19 70 
Period Cost of land per acre NC 
% 
Price Change 
1900-1909 Free 
1910-1919 Free 
1920-1929 2.70 
1930-1939 4.20 55.6 
1940-1949 6.70 59.5 
1950-1959 9.20 37.3 
1960-1970 12.20 32.6 
Source: Ghana Ministry of Agriculture: Annual Report (1970). 
2.3.2 Labour 
Investigations into the labour force of the cocoa industry so far 
have concluded that there is a very high degree of imperfection in 
labour specialisation. As high as 40 per cent of the cocoa fanners 
studied by Polly Hill (1956), for instance, had jobs besides cocoa 
cultivation, especially in commerce and other aspects of agriculture. 
Beckett's (1945) findings were not different from Polly Hill's. The 
demand and supply of labour were further noted to be seasonal in nature. 
The 1960 population census provided the following approximations 
of labour absorbed by the industry in the year (see Table 2.5). The 
figure of 522,350 represents about 20 per cent of the total labour force 
in the country in 1960 (see Table 1.5). 
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TABLE 2.5 
NUMBERS OF PEOPLE ENGAGED IN COCOA GROWING, BY SEX 
Region Male Female Total 
Ash ant i 112,960 44,910 157,870 
Brong Ahafu 69,670 22,780 92,450 
Eastern 73,960 34,300 108,260 
Central 
Western 81,920 35,760 117,680 
Volta 33,710 10,360 44,070 
Accra 1,400 220 1,620 
Northern 380 20 400 
TOTAL 347,000 148,350 522,350 
Source: Birmingham (ed.), (1966), Vol. 1, p.238. 
The structure of labour on the cocoa farms - Arising from the 
detailed research of Polly Hill, a number of different labour categories 
have been identified in the cocoa industry in Ghana. 
Though many cocoa farmers and their families still work on their 
farms, the employment of hired labour even by the small fanners has 
become a regular feature of cocoa growing. The Nowell Commission of 
1937 reported that multiple and absentee ownership had developed 
involving the complete use of hired labour, and that very many of the 
so-called farmers neither grow nor market their cocoa. There are 
specified terms for different categories of labour depending on their 
specialisation. Thus, the Abusa labourer is a person who is usually 
rewarded with a one-third share of the cocoa harvested. He is the most 
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important landless worker on the cocoa farms, not only because of his 
relatively higher wage, but in terms of his overall contribution to the 
industry. The Abusa labourer is usually an enterprising and knowledge-
able cocoa cultivator, who often has capital, but has no land of his 
own. He therefore obtains a lease through the pledging system or from 
the chief of the village to start a cocoa farm, but he is obliged by 
tradition to divide the harvest into three and gives one-third each to 
the chief of the area and the owner of the land, keeping the remainder 
for himself. Research revealed sufficient evidence that the Ghana 
cocoa industry flourished from the excellence of this class of labourer. 
On the other hand, the Nkotokuano labourer is usually concerned 
with the establishment of new farms. But he is fully maintained by the 
farmer during the period of his employment and receives his cash 
remuneration when he leaves, usually after a year, though sometimes after 
six months. 
In addition, there is the Daily labourer. He is paid by the day, 
but may be employed for a number of days consecutively, especially in 
certain times of the year when work on the farm is required, e.g., in 
the harvesting season. 
The Contract labourer is paid a sum of money agreed to in advance 
for clearing, or weeding, or clearing and planting a certain specified 
area. He is therefore different from the other categories of 
labourers. 
There are quite a few barriers to entry into each of these labour 
categories. These are discussed by Hill. It is particularly 
interesting to note that the barriers are such that there can occur an 
acute shortage of one type of labour alongside a surplus of another 
type in the same locality. Table 2.6 shows the estimated size of each 
category of worker on the cocoa farms. 
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TABLE 2.6 
CATEGORIES OF COCOA LABOUR, 1960 
Types of Labour Male Female Total 
Cocoa farmers 235,280 77,230 312,510 
Family labour 26,850 63,990 90,840 
Abusa labourers 47,410 2,670 50,080 
Nkotokuano and others 64,460 4,460 68,920 
TOTAL 374,460 148,350 522,350 
Source: Birmingham (ed.), (1966), Vol.1, p.239. 
The size of the Abusa and Nkotokuano labour force is certainly 
underestimated because the estimates were made in March 1960. Those 
workers who do not come from the cocoa region travel back home during 
the period of February to August only to return in about July when the 
demand for labour on the cocoa farms is high. Thus, the enumeration of 
workers on cocoa farms in March is bound to miss out a large proportion 
of them. 
As in the case of land, labour costs have also been on the rise 
since 1900 (see Table 2.7, below). 
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TABLE 2.7 
LABOUR COSTS ON COCOA FARMS, 1900-1970 
Period 
Cost of Labour 
(A Day Labourer) 
NC 
Percentage 
Price Change 
1900-1909 0.05 
1910-1919 0.075 50.0 
1920-1929 0.10 33.3 
19 30-19 39 0.15 50.0 
1940-1949 0.25 66.7 
1950-1959 0.35 40.0 
1960-1970 0.45 28.6 
1900-1970 0.40 800.0 
Source; Ghana Ministry of Agriculture: Annual Report (1970). 
2.3.3 Capital 
Cocoa production in Ghana so far has been more land and labour 
intensive than capital intensive. Thus, increases in production have 
depended upon increases in the amount of land and labour available. 
But the economic indicators of rising wages and land rent, which are 
a direct result of a progressive scarcity of labour and land, 
respectively, seem to spell out the need to reverse the current 
techniques of production. 
So far the capital equipment required by the cocoa farmer is 
relatively simple and few. It is mainly in the form of cash to hire 
labour and buy a few simple implements for the clearance of the forest 
and also needs for the establishment of a new farm. The ordinary cocoa 
farming family, as Oluwansanmi (1966, p.83) has found in the very 
similar conditions of Nigeria, may require about: 
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seven hoes 
twelve machetes 
four cocoa-knives 
- nine baskets 
drying platform 
- simple mate 
farm house for on-farm workers 
a spraying machine 
seeds. 
Many of the above items can be, and are, made by local blacksmiths who 
charge less than foreign manufacturers. Other capital equipment can be 
borrowed or shared, e.g., the drying platform. 
As labour and land become more scarce, it may become more 
economical to resort to more mechanical devices for land clearance, 
weeding, harvesting and drying. Bigger farmers have already begun to 
look at this trend with favour. Eventually, more money may also be sunk 
into rejuvenating previously acquired old farms, by an increased use of 
fertilisers and sprays to control pests and diseases, which are more 
prevalent on old farms than new ones. 
Thus a situation of a kind of change in technique in favour of a 
higher capital intensity is fast approaching the Ghana cocoa industry. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF SUPPLY FUNCTION STUDIES FOR GHANA COCOA 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Many attempts at determining the supply function for Ghana cocoa 
have been made using variations on a basic Nerlovian lag model. The 
intention of this chapter is to summarise four of the major works 
dealing with this subject. Some of the findings and conclusions may 
be used in subsequent chapters of the present study. The works to be 
discussed in historical order are those of Peter Ady (1949), R. M. 
Stern (1965), M. J. Bateman (1965) and J. R. Behrman (1966). The four 
models are beset with various conceptual and theoretical as well as 
data scarcity problems. These shall be discussed at the end of the 
summary. 
3.1 PETER ADY'S MODEL (1949, pp.389-399) 
This model is based on the argument that the level of potential 
output in the year of harvest depends upon the number of bearing trees 
and their yield in that year. The number of bearing trees is a function 
of the rate of planting in earlier years together with the mortality 
rate during the years of growth. Given the population of bearing trees 
and the assumption that geographical distribution does not affect 
yields, their yield depends chiefly upon climatic influences in the year 
of harvest. The actual harvest cropped and marketed as compared with 
this potential upper limit, Ady claims, may itself be affected by 
current economic factors such as harvest prices in relation to costs of 
cropping and marketing. 
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Ady's problem is to construct an appropriate economic model which 
suggests the factors determining the following two indices: 
t 
1. The replacement of bearing trees. (This can be 
identified with the planting rate if the mortality 
rate can be assumed to be constant.) 
2. The ratio of the crop actually harvested and 
marketed each year to the tonnage potentially 
available. 
In economic terms, this amounts to the formulation of long run and short 
run supply functions, and the sinqjlest hypothesis would be that both 
long and short run supplies are functions of the 'real' price of cocoa. 
This is the hypothesis Ady tests for the period 1920-1940. 
General Function for Cocoa 1920-1940; 
^r = ' • ... (1.1) 
L L a L L 
where, 
E^ = actual sales of cocoa harvested at time t. 
TT = cocoa prices in real terms (i.e., cocoa prices 
in money terms deflated by the index of the 
general price level). 
R = index of climatic factors. 
a = lag between year of planting and full bearing, 
n = rate of discount. 
The long and short run supply functions are: 
Long run: 
e'^  = f(TT ) ... (1.2) 
t t-a 
where. 
E^ = harvest expected upon the basis of prices 
in the year of planting, i.e., at time 
a years earlier. 
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Short run; 
c^ . , X nt 
where, 
E^/E^ = ratio of actual harvests to 
harvests expected on the basis of 
the LR function. 
For the purpose of the above investigations the following series was 
constructed by Ady: 
E = tonnage of cocoa exports expressed as a quantity 
relative (1938 = 100) (Source; Annual Trade Reports 
of the Gold Coast.) A calendar year was used. 
P = cocoa price index; cocoa price f.o.b. excluding 
aggregate duty were used since no reliable information 
on prices received by the farmers existed. 
I = import price index of main imports consumed in the 
cocoa belt for the period 1921-1947 (1938 = 100). 
Estimations; 
A long run supply function, 1920-1940; 
Adopting a 9-year lag, the long run supply equation obtained by 
taking the least squares on the log values and transformed 
again was; 
E^ = • 36 ... (1.4) 
r = .83, O = ±.05 
where, 
r = the correlation coefficient. 
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But the presence of serial correlation in the series used is a 
major defect of (1.4) above. To overcome that problem the LR 
supply equation is transformed to first differences and the results 
found were: 
- « ••• 
r = .69, a = ±.04 
e = .43 ± .1 
where, 
3 = the coefficient of regression of (1.5). 
Since (r), the correlation coefficient in (1.5) is still signifi-
cant at the 5 per cent significance level and the regression 
coefficient was of the same order and sign as in (1.4) above, the 
first differences equation incorporates the general character of 
the supply function - (a positive slope). 
Short run supply function, 1930-1940: 
Ady suggests that in the short run much depends upon the influence 
of climatic factors which may mask the responses of farmers to 
short run changes in price. However, no climatic variable was 
included because there was no suitable data available. Hence, no 
valid short run supply function for this period could be constructed. 
The residuals were not even sufficiently free from random error, 
for the sample of years available was also too small. The 
correlation of residual export quantities with current prices showed 
no association (r = .03), while the residual variance to be 
explained was small in relation to the changes in trend revealed by 
the long run analysis above. 
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Ady's Conclusions; 
Changes In the magnitude of cocoa exports In Ghana before 1939 were 
explained largely by the effect of changes in cocoa prices upon planting 
nine years earlier. 
The Influence of current factors upon exports was very small hence 
the short run elasticity of supply was low. The short run supply 
function analysis was far from complete due to deficiencies of the data 
used. There was no correlation between short term changes in output and 
short term changes in real prices. Finally, the regression coefficient 
was not significantly different from zero. 
The chief value of the analysis was in emphasising the importance 
of economic factors in the supply of Ghana cocoa. It showed that there 
was evidence that the peasant cocoa producers showed positive response 
to price changes because of the positive supply elasticity which she 
found, irrespective of it being low. 
3.2 ROBERT M. STERN'S MODEL (1965, pp.65-82) 
S t e m ' s Investigations of the cocoa supply function centred on the 
determination of the relationships between: 
1. The acreage planted and the real price of cocoa 
to the farmer. 
2. The annual harvested acreage and the real price 
of cocoa to the farmer. 
3. The level of and changes in current production 
and price, etc. 
His overall intention was to determine the cocoa supply functions of 
the major West African producing countries: Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory 
Coast, Cameroons, etc. 
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Relation between Acreage Planted and the Price of Cocoa: 
Because data were not accessible in any other form, centred five-
year moving averages of acreage planted and the real price of cocoa for 
Nigeria were used by Stem to determine a model thus: 
AP^ = a + bP^ ... (2.1) 
where, 
AP^ = five-year average acreage planted to cocoa. 
bP^ = five-year average real price of cocoa. 
Both AP^ and bP^ are centred on the middle year t. 
Using Nigeria's data, which were the only data available, the 
results below were obtained: 
Nigeria 1919/20 - 19A4/45: 
AP^ = 5.14 + l.llP^ 
(2.05) (.09) 
r2 = .85, F = 152.76 
Stem contends that the above regression is highly significant. 
It implies a price elasticity taken at the mean of 1.29 for acreage 
planted. Therefore the nunter of acres planted responds to the 
variation of cocoa prices. 
Annual Harvested Acreage and Price Relationships: 
Here Stern fails to take into account the short run production 
decisions which affect the size and nature of the annual harvest 
through farmers devoting greater or lesser expense and attention to 
the maintenance and husbandiry of the trees, methods of harvesting, 
the use of fertilizers, and the application of sprays to control 
disease and pests, etc. 
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A relationship between annual changes in acreage harvested and 
various formulations of the current and real lagged price of cocoa 
were hypothesised. But of all the formulations tested only the one 
for price lagged one year was statistically significant when the only 
data available, that of Ghana for the period 1923/24 - 1937/38, were 
used. 
Ghana 1923/24 - 1937/38: 
Using a linear function AAH^ = a + where AAH^ is the change 
in the harvested area between calendar years and the price 
in the previous period. 
AAH^ = -18.01 + ... (2.2) 
(7.92) (.08) 
= .41, F = 8.18 
The Level of and Changes in Current Production: 
Stern's task here is to determine whether different time effects 
can be sorted out in attempting to explain the annual level and 
changes in the current production of cocoa. To do this it is postulated 
that: 
Y^ = a + b^A^ + b^P^. + b^t ... (2.3) 
where. 
Y^ = the current annual level of cocoa production. 
a = a constant. 
A = the number of bearing acres in year t. 
P = the current real price of cocoa, 
t = a linear time trend representing net 
influences by productivity and other 
unspecified phenomena. 
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To test (2.3) above, data on total bearing acreage in a given year are 
required. Such data are not available, so it was thought to be of 
interest if the data on harvested acreage for Ghana might be used 
instead. 
Ghana 1923/24 - 1937/38; 
Y^ = 203.16 + 1.05AH^ + .54P^ ... (2.4A) 
(190.64) (.47) (.25) 
R^ = .40, F = 4.05 
Y^ = 392.37 - .61AH^ + .32P^ + 6.52t ... (2.4B) 
(271.16) (.70) (.21) (2.34) 
R^ = .65, F = 6.82 
Y^ = 200.88 + 4.88t ... (2.4C) 
(1.38) 
R^ = .49, F = 12.55 
While all of the foregoing were statistically significant according to 
the F-ratio, it can be seen that the introduction of the time trend 
into the first formulation changed the sign for the harvested acreage 
from positive to negative. The explanation, according to Stem, lies 
in the inadequacy of the acreage harvested measure insofar as it 
failed to reflect the substantial increase in the total number of 
bearing acres. Above all, the increase in productivity due 
undoubtedly to the shift towards a more favourable age distribution of 
these acres as a consequence of new plantings is responsible for this. 
The importance of the latter is seen in the last of the three 
formulations in which the time trend explained approximately one-half 
of the variation in the level of current production. 
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In order to improve upon the quality of the acreage variable it was 
suggested that a lagged cocoa price of 8 years be introduced thus: 
AA^ = a+b?^_g ... (2.5) 
i.e., the annual change in the current number of bearing acrea, AA^, 
can be approximated by the average real price of cocoa eight years 
earlier assuming 8 years is the gestation period for cocoa to come 
into full bearing. Taking the first differences of (2.3) above, we 
obtain: 
= ••• (2.6) 
reflects the long run profit expectation associated with past 
plantings, while AP^ represents short run profitability. The constant 
(b^) should be taken for the average change in output due to 
productivity changes and other unspecified factors. 
Using the basic equation (2.6) above, four different estimations 
were made for Ghana, Nigeria and Brazil, and two for the Ivory Coast 
and Cameroon. Out of all the estimates, only those for Ghana for the 
period prior to the end of the Second World War proved to be 
statistically significant, as shown below. Furthermore, the only 
regression coefficients which were significant were for the change in 
current price (AP^). 
Ghana 1919/20 - 1938/39: 
AY = .OAP^ „ + .A8AP^ ... (2.6A) t t—o t 
(04) (18) 
= .31, F = 3.90 
AY^ = .003P^_^ + .48AP^ + 7.27 ... (2.6B) 
(.09) (.18) 
= .29, F = 3.49 
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Ghana 1919/20 - 1945/46: 
AY^ = .03P^_g + .51AP^ ... (2.6A2) 
(.04) (.18) 
R^ = .26, F = 4.25 
AY^ = .05Pj._g + .51AP^ - 2.99 ... (2.66^) 
R^ = .26, F = 4.22 
Ghana 1946/47 - 1963/64: 
AY^ = .14Pj._g + .5MP^ ... (2.6A3) 
(.12) (.53) 
R^ = .13, F = 1.14 
AY^ = .30P^ „ + .64 P^ - 16.50 ... (2.6BJ t t-o t 3 
(29) (.57) (27.18) 
R2 = .11, F = .90 
Ghana 1919/29 - 1963/64: 
AY^ = .05? „ + .51AP^ ... (2.6A,) t t—O t H 
(.04) (.19) 
R^ = .17, F = 4.23 
AY = .07P „ + .51AP - 2.04 ... (2.6B,) t t-o t k 
(.09) (.19) (10.78) 
= .15, F = 3.74 
Stem's Findings: 
The results of the above estimations for Ghana show that on its 
own, the average lagged real price of cocoa for eight years previously 
is insufficiently tuned to reflect the annual change in output 
associated with the new acreage cowing into bearing in a particular year. 
One hardly ever expects acreage planted to be a function of price only, 
anyway. (See Bateman's estimation of acreage planted on p.14.) 
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The short run price elasticity of supply found above has a positive 
though relatively low correlation, e.g., 
Price elasticity of supply 
1919/20 - 1938/39 .17 
1919/20 - 1945/46 .15 
1946/47 - 1963/64 not significant 
The short run price change was not significant in the post-war 
years, probably due to the introduction of the Marketing Board which 
probably altered the expectations and behaviour of producers with 
respect to costs and returns. 
The failure to obtain significant results for the other countries 
may be due to the crudities of the available data as much as to the 
way in which the model was specified. 
On balance, Stem concluded that the findings reached in his 
study provided clear evidence of the responsiveness to price of cocoa 
acreage planted in Nigeria in the period prior to the end of the 
Second World War and of acreage harvested and production in Ghana in 
the same period. 
3.3 BATEMAN'S MODEL (1965, pp.384-401) 
Two main points of interest constituted Bateman's study of the 
supply of Ghana cocoa. To determine: 
1. the forces which motivate the farmer to plant, and 
2. the relationship between acres planted and output 
of cocoa harvested, 
his general strategy was to determine the behavioural and agronomic 
interconnections relative to the planting and output of cocoa, which 
could then enable him to estimate a regional and an aggregate supply 
function for the country. 
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PLANTING AND PRICE RELATIONSHIP 
Assumptions: 
(i) It is assumed that the objective of the farmer is to 
maximise the present discounted value of the future 
stream of net returns from his investment in cocoa. 
The number of acres planted in cocoa is quite 
important in this respect. 
(ii) It is also assumed that the influence of other 
economic pursuits, with the exception of coffee, was 
very small throughout most of the period. 
(iii) The expected long run profitability of growing cocoa 
related to the pattern of future prices. Yield and 
cost expectations are not major influences in 
determining acreage planted because yield patterns 
have changed slowly over time, while cost 
fluctuations with respect to land, labour and seed 
have been directly related to changes in cocoa prices 
to farmers. 
Therefore, the relationship between planting and the farmers' price 
expectations is formulated as follows: 
where, 
n + 1 
^ t=l 
n + 1 
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X^ = the number of acres of cocoa planted in year t. 
P*^^^ = the expected real price of cocoa in year t+1. 
C*^^^ = the expected real price of coffee in year t+1. 
r = the farmers subjective rate of discount. 
The first equation states that the number of acres planted in any 
one year is a function of the mean value of the discounted future prices 
of cocoa and the alternative crop, coffee. (The number of periods is 
about 40, this being the average life of a cocoa tree in Ghana.) 
Price expectations are assumed to be formed in the following 
Nerlovian form: 
Cj. - = - ... (3.2B) 
where, 
P^ = the real producer price of cocoa in year t. 
C^ = the real producer price of coffee in year t. 
The price expectation equations state that the difference between 
this year's mean expected prices and last year's average is related 
to the difference between the actual producer price this year and the 
mean value of last year's expectations. The model suggests that the 
primary factor which causes a change in the farmer's price expectations 
from one year to the next is the change in real producer prices. 
The supply function and the price expectation models are combined 
to obtain equation (3.3) below, assuming for mathematical convenience 
that the adjustment coefficients 3 = Y-
X = a 3 + a,3P + + (l-B)X + V ... (3.3) 
t O i t Z t t —X L 
where, 
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No data exist for the model to be tested as It Is In (3.3) above. 
But resorting to annual amounts of cocoa harvest which are available, 
the estimates of the price elasticities in (3.3) above, may be 
obtained in the following manner. 
Relationship between Planting and Output: 
It is known that output in any one year is the result of plantings 
in a number of preceding years. Bateman therefore continued his 
investigation in the following way: 
oo 
= E (biX^_^) ... (3.4) 
i=k. 
where, 
Q*^ = the potential output of cocoa in year t. 
bi = the potential yield per acre in year t, 
of cocoa planted in year t-i. 
X^ ^ = acreage planted in t-i. 
k = the age at which cocoa trees first begin to 
bear. 
Given that there are two distinct periods of growth in the yield of 
cocoa per acre and per tree prior to attainment of peak production, 
equation 3-4 is rewritten as below: 
, oo 
... (3.5) 
rs-l ^ f
Q*t = ^ 
^1=1 J 
where, 
k = age at which cocoa trees first begin to bear. 
It is also assumed that this is the year in 
which the first significant increase in yield 
occurs. 
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s = the year in which the second distinct increase 
in yield occurs, 
b ^ = the output per acre after the first increase 
in yield. 
b^ = output per acre after the second output per 
acre plateau is reached. 
Yield per acre prior to k is assumed to be zero, but is constant from 
s-1. At s yield is at a maximum and remains so indefinitely (due to 
regeneration of trees, or replacement of dead or aged trees). 
But to determine the actual yield it is necessary to introduce 
the effects of climatic factors - rainfall and humidity. The 
possibility also exists that not all cocoa produced in year t will be 
harvested. Current economic factors such as producer prices in 
relation to the costs of cropping and marketing, may affect the actual 
harvest. Therefore, the behavioural relation is confined with the 
climatic variables to produce -
rs-1 / 00 > 
Z X , + E X , + cR , + dH , + . , t-i 2 . , t-i t-1 t-1 4 = k 4 = k 
( 3 . 6 ) 
where. 
Q^ = the amount of cocoa harvest in year t. 
R^ ^ = the influence of rainfall during the crucial 
growing months (March-June). The lag occurs 
because the crop year begins in October and 
extends to the following September. 
H^ ^ = the humidity variable which affects yield 
through black pod and other fungi diseases. 
p = the price paid to the producer in year t 
deflated by the cost of living index. 
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The first difference is taken of equation (3.6) to arrive at (3.7) 
below: 
^^t = ^ l ^ V k ^ ^ ( ^ V l ^ + e(AR^) 
... (3.7) 
Equation (3.7) above, states that the change in cocoa harvested from 
one year to the next is a function of planting in year t-k and t-s, the 
differences in rainfall and humidity in t-1 and t-2 plus the change in 
prices from t-1 to t. 
The next and final step is to combine equation (3.7) and the 
planting-price model (3.3) in order to provide a theoretical framework 
for which data exist: 
where, 
^ = h V k ^ V s 
This final equation suggests that the change in cocoa harvested from 
year to year can be explained by producer prices, rainfall and humidity, 
and lagged changes in output. and enter the 
equation because they directly determine planting in their respective 
years. The change in P^, and enter because of their direct 
effects on output in t and t-1. The final four variables enter the 
equation as substitutes for the lagged acreage variables in equation 
(3.3). 
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APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
Regional Supply Function; 
The cocoa growing area of Ghana was divided by Bateman Into five 
main regions: 
1. Central region 
2. Western region 
3. Volta region 
4. Old Ashantl 
5. Sunyanl and Goaso, 
The division was according to soil, climatic factors and availability of 
data. The time period covered was 1946-1962. 
Results; 
In every region the coefficients for ^t-2' ^t 1 ^t 
were not significant and very close to zero. See Appendix 3.A for the 
other results which were significant. A zero coefficient for the lagged 
dependent variable (Q^ j^ ) suggests that the 3 coefficient in the 
Nerlovlan model is approximately one and further imples that the farmers' 
pattern of future price expectations relevant for planting purposes is 
largely shaped by the prices prevailing at the time. The not significant 
coefficient for the current price variable suggests that harvesting 
is not influenced by producer prices. As a consequence of the above 
results, the equation which was estimated was; 
AQ^ = b^a^ + + V t - s ^ 
w h e r e , 
tJ = U , + U^ 
t t-k t-s 
(See Appendix 3.A for details.) 
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Almost all were significant at the one, two and five per cent 
significance level except in the Eastern region. The Central region 
was the only one in which both coffee price coefficients were 
insignificant since it does not produce coffee. On the other hand, both 
coffee prices were significant in Sunyani but only at the 25 per cent 
level. 
The price elasticity of supply was positive in all regions but the 
size varied inversely with age. For example, the oldest area (Eastern 
region) has the lowest response, while the newest region (Sunyani) 
exhibits the largest. This is shown in Table 3.1, below. 
TABLE 3.1 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR REGIONAL SUPPLY FUNCTIONS FOR GHANA COCOA 
Region 
Cocoa Price Coffee Price 
Rainfall Humidity 
^ - k ^t-k ^t-s 
Central .19 .25 .29 
Western .35 .36 -.54 .16 
Volta .32 .29 -.52 .13 -.08 
Eastern - .32 -.37 .15 -.04 
Old Ashanti .12 .30 -.52 .15 -.09 
Sunyani .47 .40 -.53 -1.00 .82 -.30 
Source; Journal of Farm Economics (1965), Vol.47, p.396. 
Note: The elasticities have been calculated at the sample means, 
and the coefficients in this table correspond to the 
equations in Appendix 3.A, in which the non significant 
variables have been eliminated. The total response of 
output changes to price movement is given by the sum of 
the two cocoa price elasticities in Table 3.1 above. 
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AGGREGATE SUPPLY FUNCTION 
In the attempt to determine an aggregate supply function for the 
country as a whole, the homogeneity hypothesis (i.e., that all areas of 
production were very similar) was rejected on all counts when various 
regional combinations were tried. Only three regions, the Volta, Central 
and Sunyani and possibly a fourth, Western, indicated any semblance of 
homogeneity (see Appendix 3.B). 
Bateman's Conclusions; 
The major findings of the paper include: 
the importance of cocoa and coffee prices to the areas 
planted; 
the peculiar lag structure between planting and bearing; 
the importance of rainfall and, to a lesser extent, 
humidity; 
an inference that the growing season shifts as one 
moves westward across Ghana (because the rain-bearing 
winds hit Ghana first in the west and then move further 
to the east later); 
the differential response of output to lagged cocoa and 
coffee prices, attributable to the different soil and 
age structures; and 
finally, the basic conclusion was that it was folly 
trying to estimate an aggregate supply function for the 
entire forest zone of Ghana. 
60 
3.4 JERE R. BEHRMAN'S MODEL (1966, pp.712-714) 
Behrman built this model for each of the eight leading cocoa 
producing countries; Ghana, of course, being one of these. He 
acknowledged right at the beginning that his model was drawn substantially 
from Bateman's model. It is therefore no surprise that the two models 
are so similar. 
The most significant difference between the two models is that 
Behrman prefers the assumption that the desired area in cocoa trees in 
the t^^ period (A*^ )^ , is a function of the producer's real price 
expectations held at the time t both for cocoa and for the alternative 
crop coffee, compared to Bateman's assumption that the actual area 
planted in cocoa is a function of expected prices over the bearing 
period of the trees. Behrman's investigation of the cocoa supply 
function then proceeds as follows: 
where, 
A*^ ^ = the desired area in cocoa trees in the t^^ period. 
PC ^ = the expected real price of cocoa in year t. 
PCF^^ = the expected real price of coffee in year t. 
Equation (4.1) above, states that the desired area in cocoa trees is 
a function of the producer's real price expectations held at time t both 
for cocoa and for coffee. 
The actual area in trees at time t (A^) is hypothesised to be a 
function of the desired area in trees, formulated as (4.2) below: 
\ = -20 V l - V l > ••• 
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The expected real prices of cocoa and coffee over the lifetime of the 
cocoa tree are hypothesised to be a weighted average of all actual real 
prices. 
P C \ = a3Q + PcS-1 + - ^ V l ^ "3.t ••• 
= ^ P^ V^l + ^l^ C^^ Vl - PCF^-i) + ••• 
where, 
= actual real price of cocoa. 
= actual real price of coffee. 
In order to conserve degrees of freedom, a^ ^^  and a^^ are assumed equal. 
Equations (4.1) to (4.4) could be manipulated to obtain the current 
area of cocoa in terms of observable prices. But since no satisfactory 
time series data for area in cocoa exists (for Ghana), subsequent work 
was based on quantity of cocoa actually produced (Q^) assumed to be 
thus: 
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where, 
Q^ = actual cocoa produced. 
y(i) = average yield per unit of area i years after planting. 
Equation (4-5) above, states that the quantity of cocoa produced in the 
t^^ year is a weighted sum of all past areas planted in cocoa, in which 
the area planted in the (t-l)'"'^  year is weighted by the average 
yield per unit of area i years after planting, y(i). In addition, this 
weighted sum must be adjusted for possible responses in husbandry to 
real cocoa prices lagged one period and to possible responses in 
harvesting to current real cocoa prices. 
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The infinite sum in (4.5) may be eliminated by taking the first 
difference, relying on an observation that the yield of cocoa per unit 
area has a distinctive pattern. This gives us: 
AQ^ = + {y(n^) + ^Sl^^'^t 
+ ... (4.6) 
Yield Pattern 
Yield per acre is negligible for the years immediately after 
planting and then increases abruptly to y(n^) in the n^ *^ ^ year to what 
is almost a plateau. The yield per unit area then may increase 
relatively abruptly to y(n2) in the n^ *^ ^ year to a higher plateau, on 
which the increasing yield per tree is offset by the loss of trees. 
The estimate values for n^ and n^ for the leading producing countries 
are given in Appendix 3.C. 
Finally, to obtain a supply expression in terms of observable 
variables, equations (4.1) to (4.4) and (4.6) may be manipulated to 
eliminate and as in (4.7) below: 
AQ^ = 4- b^AQ^,^ + b3APC^ -h + b^APC^,^ + 
... (4.7) 
where, 
b^'s = algebraic combinations of the ai's and y(n^) and 
y(n2). 
Estimates of (4.7) above are shown in Appendix 3.D. U^ was assumed ' > t 
to be a random variable with mean = 0 and constant variance. 
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Behrman's Findings and Conclusions; 
There exists a two-point identification problem because the adjust-
ment coefficients a^^ and a^^^ entered the definition of the coefficients 
of the equation (4.7) symmetrically. The signs of the estimates 
suggest, however, that at least one of these coefficients (and both for 
Nigeria, Brazil and the Dominican Republic) is greater than one in 
value. Thus, overadjustment in planted area or price expectations seems 
to be the problem (see equations (4.2) and (4.3)). He found that his 
estimates did not explain the variance in production as well as did 
Bateman's for the regions of Ghana for two possible reasons: 
(i) the failure to include important weather factors 
because of the unavailability of data, and 
(ii) because of the level of aggregation at which the 
analysis was performed. 
Behrman, however, concluded that his estimates suggest long-run 
price elasticities of the same order of magnitude as those which 
Bateman obtained. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE MODELS 
None of the above models summarised is free from defects in one 
respect or another. 
Theoretical and Conceptual Defects; 
The model by Ady is characterised by a serious misspecification 
error as pointed out by Bateman. The long run portion of the model, 
Bateman criticised, states that all cocoa available for harvesting 
in year t was a function of prices in year t-9; supposedly following 
from the observation that planting in year t-9 was influenced by 
prices in that same year and that it takes nine years for cocoa to 
attain full bearing. The problem with the formulation is that output 
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in year t is not only the result of planting which occurred in t-9, 
but also the planting in t-10, t-11, etc. Since cocoa is a perennual 
crop and continues to bear fully for a number of years (about 30) once 
it has reached maturity, output in any one year is therefore a function 
of planting and consequently of prices over a period of many years for 
which the model did not account. 
But while Bateman has rightly shown cause for discontent with Ady's 
model, his own model is considered to have theoretical errors also. 
For example. Bacon (1968, pp.187-188) proved, as below, that the 
Bateman price expectation formulation is unsatisfactory. 
Bateman's Formulation as seen by R. Bacon; 
P = P* ,,/(l+r)^ ,, 
t o t+l ... (5.1) 
n + 1 
where, 
P*^^^ = expected real producer price of cocoa in t+1 
= average future discounted price expected. 
Bateman then conntects these decision prices by a Nerlovian equation: 
- = ••• (5.2) 
This is to give the way in which expectations (on P*) are formed. 
Substituting (5.1) into (5.2): 
E P* - (1-3) ? ,.,/(l+r)^ = (n+l)3P^ ... (5.3) 
t=o t=o 
therefore, 
P* 
t+n 
... (5.4) 
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Collecting like terms in (t+k) of which a typical term is -
(l-B) I l t i ^ -(l+r)k+l (l+r)k " (l+r)k+l 
therefore, 
^*t+n " (l+r)"{(n+l)3Pj. + - (r+3)P*j. + (n+l)3P^.} ... (5.6) 
That is the price expectations formation implicit in Bateman's model, 
as derived by Bacon. Bacon, from equation (5.6) above, concluded that 
there are two features of the model which are highly unsatisfactory: 
(i) it is really only applicable to prices for period t+n. 
All other expectations must be assumed to be unchanged. 
(ii) expected prices depend on the farmer's rate of subjective 
discounting. 
The Bateman price model is, however, accepted as satisfactory but in a 
naive fashion. 
The Bateman, Behrman and Stem models have been further faulted in 
the formation of the price expectations by not taking into consideration 
the effect of the world price. Ady (1968, p.164) argued in a review 
article in 1968 that throughout the period of statutory control (starting 
from 1939, the period covered by the three models), it is more plausible 
to believe that price expectations would be related not only to the level 
of controlled producer prices but also to the levels obtaining for world 
prices. An appropriate price expectation hypothesis, taking both series 
into account could be written either as -
where, 
7T = world prices. 
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= ... (5.8) 
where, 
tt' = a weighted average of world prices. 
Thus the planting hypothesis could be -
+ dAE^ ... (5.9) 
Both models by Bateman and Behrman did not adequately treat the 
mathematical aspect of the adjustments: 3 and and a^^ and 
Bateman simply assumed 3 to be equal to a , as Behrman likewise did to 
a^j^ and a^^. What happens if 3 and a^j^ a^^ have not been 
considered (see Nerlove's (1958) discussions of this problem). Behrman 
faced difficulties of identification in his estimation results because 
a^^ and a^^ entered his definition of the coefficients of his final 
equation symmetrically. (See first point of summary for the Behrman 
model.) 
CONCLUSION 
All the four models were formulated in the face of immense data 
scarcity. This resulted in that fact that some important variables 
could not be catered for in some of the models. For example, Ady and 
Behrman missed out the climatic variable. Ady noted that the importance 
of this variable makes it particularly unfortunate that no suitable 
index of climate could be constructed from independent yield data. 
She concluded that since the climatic variable was perforce to be 
omitted no valid short run supply function could be constructed. 
In similar fashion, Behrman also attributed his model's inability to 
explain the variance in production as did Bateman's, partly to the 
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failure to include important weather variables because of unavailability 
of data. The models are also rather circumlocutious, except that by 
Ady. Both Stera, Bateman and Behrman, for example, could have estimated 
the elasticities of their relevant variables directly from equations 
(2.3), (3.3) and 4.1), respectively, if they had data on acreages, or 
numbers of trees and the yield, etc. But this was not possible and so 
additional postulations and mathematical formulations had to follow. 
The problem with these round-about procedures is the additional defects 
absorbed by the models, which further weakened the credibility of their 
results. For instance, the shift from planting equations to the 
potential and actual cocoa harvested equations, introduced auto-
regressive elements, e.g., and into the models. Biased 
estimates are highly likely in the event of the error terms being 
correlated with these autoregressive terms. 
Nevertheless, the overall conclusion drawn from the four models 
discussed is that the Ghanaian cocoa farmer responds positively to 
economic incentives such as price changes, although the validity of 
this conclusion is open to suspicion because of the serious 
limitations of the models. They could even be said to be irrelevant 
altogether, if the models are judged in isolation on only their merits 
and demerits. 
However, historical information on the subject supports the basic 
conclusion that the Ghanaian cocoa farmers respond to economic 
incentives. Some of these pieces of information recorded at various 
times by economists about the cocoa price and the Ghanaian farmers' 
responses to its variations include the following: 
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•In the remoter districts all over the country where there 
was no local market and the cost of transport to the 
nearest buying centre was more than the produce would have 
realised, the cocoa crop was left ungathered and the 
majority of the farms entirely abandoned, some of the 
owners even leaving the district in search of employment. 
This resulted in a deplorable condition of the farms, 
diseased and squirrel eaten pods of two seasons crops 
were hanging on the trees together with the fresh young 
pods, branches attacked by Loranthus parasites, numerous 
dead and decaying branches covered with white-thread 
fungus and occasional dead trees killed by a perfect 
forest of young cocoa seedlings springing up all around, 
as well as a superabundance of untended sucker growths.' 
(Gold Coast Department of Agriculture, 1920, pp.11-12) 
The above quotation from the Gold Coast Report of the Agricultural 
Department for 1918 describes the consequences of the low or rather 
zero price incentive. But the next quotation shows the response of 
farmers to the reopening of trade channels and the consequent rising 
prices of cocoa after World War I (1919): 
'Throughout the cocoa area the revival of the market 
resulted in a reawakened interest in farms which had 
been temporarily abandoned during the dormant condition 
of the industry. The cultivation accorded consisted 
merely of clearing the trees of bush growth in young 
farms, cutlassing undergrowth to permit collection of 
crops, and occasionally a minimum of rough pruning . . .' 
(Gold Coast Department of Agriculture, 1920) 
Another interesting record on the response to the cocoa price 
variation was made by the Governor of the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1921-
1922 as follows: 
'Effect of the Cocoa Boom 
The history of cocoa in 1920 taught several lessons to 
the people of this country . . . . In January the price 
of cocoa was £98 per ton. The rush of people to take 
part in the cocoa trade which had gone on in 1919 went 
on increasingly. In February the price reached the 
unprecedented figure of £122 per ton. Both Europeans 
and Africans were handling big cocoa business, and many 
of them far more money than they were used to. It was 
indeed apparent that a large number of the Gold Coast 
people had lost their heads. Members of the professions, 
clerks, artisans practically deserted their work and 
took part in the great cocoa rush. It was impossible to 
get labour. In March there were indications of a fall. 
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By May the price was down to £85. The wise men pulled 
up but the vast rnajcrity were unwise . . . . Tlie 
declining prices continued and it soon became evident 
that the bottom was going to fall temporarily out of the 
cocoa market. By December the price had dropped to £39 
per ton . . . . To begin with, hundreds of educated 
young Africans threw up their jobs, over a hundred in 
the Government service alone, and rushed off to the cocoa 
fields and markets. The majority have had a severe 
lesson [at the end of the boom]. Government appoint-
ments have naturally been closed against the return of 
those who deserted the service of their country, while 
the great decrease in the number of new firms which 
started business during the boom has decreased the amount 
of work available for their re-employment . . . . 
. . . In few cases, the men who made their money withdrew 
in time and were wise in their expenditure, but the vast 
majority of cases by the end of the boom those who took 
part in it were far poorer than before. What made matters 
worse was that the farmers neglected their food crops for 
their cocoa and consequently the price of provisions rose 
to a height unprecedented in the history of the Gold Coast. 
(Kay, 1972, pp.48-49) 
In 1931 and again in 1937, the cocoa farmers of Ghana refused to 
supply cocoa for considerable lengths of time because the price of 
cocoa was considered to be too low. The obvious causes of the low 
prices in the 1930s was the world economic depression of the time. 
More will be said about the price response of the Ghanaian cocoa farmers 
in the 1930s and 1940s in the next chapter. 
More qualitative examples of the response of the Ghana cocoa 
supply function to price changes could be adduced to show that the 
supply of cocoa in Ghana is responsive to price incentives, but this 
may be superfluous. Therefore the possibility that the relevance of 
the models has been detracted from by their weaknesses should be 
recognised, but their conclusions remain highly relevant. In fact. 
Professor Jones (1960) asserted that 'economic man' is no stranger to 
tropical Africa. He feels that, given the full opportunity to pursue 
their personal objectives, producers in Africa can be relied on as 
powerful agents to move African economies to greater productivity and 
wealth. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS FOR GHANA COCOA 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
Generally marketing is a means of achieving the transference of 
goods and services at fixed money values from one person, channel, or 
institution, to another. The study of marketing therefore encompasses 
the whole business world, beginning at the factory/farm door/gate and 
ending at the retail counter when the money value of these goods and 
services is given in exchange for consumption or investment (of capital 
goods). Buying, selling, financing, risking, transportation and market 
information are the major activities in marketing (Rastogi, 1965, p.2). 
They are technically described as marketing 'functions' by Professor 
P. T. Cherington and he classified these functions into three groups: 
1. Merchandise functions - transportation, storage, etc. 
(These add place and time utility.) 
2. Auxiliary functions - financing and risking. 
3. Sales functions - buying, selling, standardisation, 
marketing information, etc.(Rastogi, 1965) 
Cocoa marketing necessarily involves all these functions, but since 
the final product is in the form of confectionery and chocolate processed 
in the consuming countries (mainly North American and European countries, 
etc.), the major concern with cocoa marketing in Ghana is the trans-
ference of the cocoa from the farmers to the processors. Thus the main 
marketing function is centred on the bulk movement of the raw material in 
the marketing chain. The marketing chain for Ghana cocoa has experienced 
three different types of marketing regimes: 
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1. Competitive marketing, 1900-1939. 
2. Wartime Controlled Marketing, 1939-1946. 
3. Statutory Monopolistic Marketing, 1947-1975. 
This chapter discusses these marketing experiences with particular 
interest in the statutory monopolistic marketing system, otherwise called 
the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (GCMB). The discussion aims at providing 
evidence of contradictions in the interests of the GCMB. 
4.1 COMPETITIVE MARKETING 
Although an official marketing scheme was initiated by Governor 
F. M. Hodgson in 1898 whereby the government agreed to pay half the price 
of all cocoa delivered by the farmers at Aburi before the crop was sold 
abroad, it had a short life and gave way to a highly competitive marketing 
system from about 1900 to 1939. During this period, about 300,000 
independent small farmers sold cocoa to exporters, which were mainly 
European firms, companies and individuals, through a large number of 
1,500 brokers. These, in turn, en?)loyed an estimated number of 37,000 
sub-brokers (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938, p.29), see Figure 
4.1(A). The sheer numbers of the participants in this market in addition 
to the fact that no barriers to entry into the industry existed, suggests 
that there was an almost perfectly competitive market. The complex 
con?)etitive chain was the answer to a prevailing costly and inefficient 
transportation and communication system, which made the farmers unwilling 
to deliver their own cocoa directly to the exporters at the coast. 
V. D. Wickizer (1951) noted that as cocoa buying, storing and shipping 
became increasingly important activities of the trading companies, keen 
rivalry developed for the middleman's services, and so acute was the 
competition between the firms that (as will be discussed later in this 
chapter) some firms operated at a loss. Indeed, the American manufacturers 
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found it cheaper to buy West African cocoa in New York than in West 
Africa. But, curiously, cocoa marketing in this period was regarded as 
quite underdeveloped by comparison with the systems of marketing of most 
basic agricultural products in the Western industrialised countries. 
Being a relatively new crop, its price fluctuated more widely than 
other internationally traded primary produce. E. Melville described the 
situation in the following words: 
'Speculative neurosis ran through the whole trade, right 
down to the cocoa farmer, and caused considerable 
disturbance and certainly dissatisfaction, at the buying 
end in Africa, not only amongst the farmers but also 
between the firms which had to tackle the very onerous 
and thankless job of taking the crop off the farmers and 
offering it in the world market.' (Melville, 1948, p.71) 
Though the task of marketing was onerous, Melville's claim that it was 
'thankless' cannot be supported by both economic principles or 
empirical evidence. For instance, the persistence of competition among 
traders of cocoa, according to economic theory, ought to mean that 
profit-making in the business was adequate. Empirical evidence given 
in the following quote also detracts from Melville's last observation: 
'In the late 30's . . . [q]uality was good. Shipments 
were regular and efficient . . . . Prices also were 
favourable for an expansion of this business and this 
industry. Perhaps prices were too favourable . . . . 
Halcyon days these were. We seemed to have been in 
paradise without knowing it. [But there] was trouble 
in the trees and there was also troiible in the minds 
of the Africans . . . . It was quite clear that things 
were not right on the farms in the Gold Coast [Ghana] 
and there was need of a new marketing build-up on a 
fair basis. These things . . . at that time cast no 
deep shadow on our paradise.' (Wickizer, 1951, p.322) 
Nevertheless, the free and competitive marketing regime came to a 
halt in 1939. The immediate cause was the advent of the Second World 
War. However, the seeds of the collapse are to be found in the adverse 
effects of the general world economic depression of the 1930s and in 
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the attempt of the exporters of cocoa to Introduce organised marketing 
into the country. 
The main effect of the depression on the cocoa industry was the 
disastrous fall in the price of cocoa paid to the farmers and exporters 
alike. The exporters tried to salvage their sinking profits by forming 
cartels in order to cut down the costs which the furore of competition 
brought about. A 'Buying Agreement' was formed (in 1937) comprising 
nearly all the exporters of cocoa from West Africa. The Agreement hoped 
to check the serious abuses which had developed as a result of 'insane 
competition between buying firms.' Abuses in the marketing system 
included over or underdeclaration of purchases by brokers during periods 
of low and high prices, respectively. These abuses had inflated the 
cost of buying cocoa to such an extent that it was usually impossible to 
make an immediate sale on the world market except at a loss. Thus cocoa 
buying in West Africa had, for these reasons, been an unprofitable 
business. 
However, the farmers detested the Buying Agreement, which they 
designated a 'pool' or a 'combine' upon which the low prices paid for 
cocoa were to be blamed, notwithstanding the effect of the world economic 
depression. The farmers argued that no such drastic and sudden 
alteration of marketing conditions was necessary. If reforms were 
needed at all, other and less objectionable methods could have been 
adopted. They stressed that the agreement was unfair both to the farmers 
and the middlemen. Furthermore, it established conditions in the buying 
of cocoa which approximated monopoly and which,coupled with the existing 
agreements for the sale of merchandise (which the exporters of cocoa 
also controlled), placed the farmers too much under the economic 
dominance of the European firms. The rather general counter arguments 
above, however, portray the Ghana cocoa farmers' intense indignation at 
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monopoly marketing. When the Buying Agreement was not withdrawn they 
refused to sell any cocoa for nearly a year. The Colonial Government 
stepped In by setting up the Nowell Commission which inquired into the 
marketing crisis in 1937. 
The commission reported that the Buying Agreement introduced in 1937 
was undesirable; but at the same time the prevailing conditions of cocoa 
marketing in Ghana and Nigeria were unsatisfactory to both the farmers 
and the exporters. The middlemen received nearly all the blame for the 
disaster (Wehner, Jr., 1964, p.151). 
As a result, co-operative marketing was recommended by the 
commission. In the new system, producers were to be associated through-
out the cocoa areas in a system of local marketing groups which would 
collect cocoa for joint sales offered in bulk lots freely and without 
discrimination to buyers (already established and any newcomers to the 
trade) at depots operated by the farmers' groups (see Figure 4.1(B)). 
The commission's recommendations were not Implemented before the 
advent of World War II and, as a result, it was shelved. 
Two major points of economic Interest are attributable to the 
period of competitive marketing: first, the Industry's rapid rate of 
growth, and secondly, the bizarre manner in which the Industry 
developed. 
As discussed in earlier chapters of this thesis, the production 
of cocoa grew from a mere 500 tonnes in 1900 to over 280,000 tonnes in 
1939. This was at a steady growth rate of about 3.5 per cent per annum, 
which established Ghana as the world's leading producer of the crop. 
Cocoa, in general, gained the popular name of the 'miracle crop' In this 
period. 
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But while rapid growth in production may be desirable, the bizarre 
nature in which the industry was encouraged to develop through the fact 
that one could always market his product without any fear of controls 
had certain undesirable consequences. These included the virtioal lack 
of data on yields per acre, age of trees, acreage planted, sales records, 
etc. Several mistakes in agronomic practices, husbandry and farm 
management, which presently beset the industry, were also made during 
this period of laissez-faire development. The early mistakes have been 
perpetuated because of the long life of cocoa trees. 
Assistance with the modernisation of the industry became extremely 
complex due to the lack of reliable data. Hence enormous effort and 
skill is required to reconstruct the missing data for modern quantitative 
forecasting. Such analysis is absolutely necessary for the present 
Marketing Board to make the best decisions for the industry and to assist 
in the development Ghana's resources according to national objectives 
and priorities. 
4.2 WARTIME CONTROLLED MARKETING 
In the circumstances of World War II, the British Government 
shelved the report of the Nowell Commission which inquired into the 
crisis of the cocoa market in 1937, and in its place instituted direct 
controls over the cocoa market in West Africa. The government assumed 
all responsibilities of risk of losses, buying and resale of all cocoa 
produced in Ghana and the other British colonies in West Africa. It 
pledged that the profits eventually realised would be distributed to 
producers directly or indirectly through colonial government for 
expenditure on objects of benefit to them (Wickizer, 1951, p.328). 
The actual purchase of the crop in 1939 was then assigned to the British 
Ministry of Food. In 1940, it was reassigned to a newly-created body -
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the West African Cocoa Control Board - and again in 1942 to the West 
African Produce Control Board which was to control other important 
tropical produce - palm oil, groundnuts, cotton, etc. 
4.2.1 The Need for Controls 
The first and immediate reason for introducing controlled marketing 
was the uncertainty about the availability of shipping space and markets 
for cocoa in the face of the World War. Normally, merchant firms would 
purchase the whole crop if they believed they could resell it over the 
year. But about two-thirds of the world market for cocoa did not need or 
could not import cocoa. For example, the United States and Britain which 
consumed over half the world's cocoa supplies, had stocks equivalent to 
almost a year's requirement, whilst Germany, the third most important 
market, was immediately shut off (Wickizer, 1951, p.329). The need for 
some state intervention was therefore a necessity, given the importance 
of cocoa to the 'British subjects' of West Africa. 
The second reason for government intervention in the cocoa trade 
suggested by Hopkins (1973) is that it was for the realisation of the 
long term vested interest of the British to establish control over the 
product, in order to guarantee supplies at controlled prices. 
The Bartholomew Plan of 1931, which was designed to use government 
power to influence the world cocoa market and to stabilise the price in 
Ghana, but which was rejected by the Gold Coast (Ghana) government as 
being dictatorial, gives credence to Hope's suggestion. The main 
beneficiaries of the controls were the British consumers and the large 
expatriate firms who not only supported government intervention but 
even helped to plan it (Hopkins, 1973, p.226). 
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^.2.2 Producer Price Policy under the Controls 
The task of m a i n t a i n i n g the West African cocoa industry at a time 
w h e n n o r m a l operations of the market might have destroyed it was performed 
by fixing annual p r i c e s . The decision each year was taken after 
consultation w i t h local governments regarding the need of the industry. 
The Board w a s also told to b e mindful that it was operating with funds 
provided by the British taxpayer w h o would have to meet any deficits of 
the Board (Wickizer, 1951). Prices were therefore generally fixed at a 
low level. A number of reasons were advanced in justification of this 
p o l i c y . 
F i r s t l y , p r i c e s , even if low, were at least certain and the producer 
was secure in the knowledge of what his product would fetch. H o w e v e r , 
the new prices did not take into account transport distances since a 
system of price 'flattening' was introduced so that the upcountry 
producer was paid a similar price to the producer near the port of 
shipment. 
S e c o n d l y , particularly after the outbreak of w a r with Japan, other 
West African commodities, notably oilseeds, palm oil and rubber, sprang 
into prominence and it was important not to divert effort from the 
production of these to cocoa which had long been in supply. Further-
m o r e , there was also the demand for labour for military work which 
needed to b e s a t i s f i e d , therefore, labour should not be unnecessarily 
attracted to cocoa farms. 
F i n a l l y , a most careful watch was necessary on the dangers of 
inflation which could arise from heavy payments for cocoa. The 
inflation relates to the smaller supply of imported goods because of 
the effect of the w a r . 
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The wartime price policy had positive as well as negative effects 
on the Ghana cocoa industry. For example, it is to the credit of the 
wartime fixed price policy that it helped the industry to survive, even 
if farm incomes were low, during the war period. 
However, the conservative price policy caused marginal fanners to 
abandon their trees. Other farmers made little or no effort to check 
the spread of cocoa disease. Furthermore, no replacement planting was 
undertaken nor were efforts made to maintain soil fertility. 
As a consequence of the low wartime price, cocoa diseases took a 
heavy toll on the cocoa trees so that the generally low supply situation 
continued long aft er the war (see Table 4.1). 
TABLE 4.1 
EFFECT OF DISEASE ON YIELD OF COCOA IN GHANA, 1945-47 
Period Number of Total yield of diseased trees cocoa pods 
August 1945 1,450 41,771 
August 1946 2,131 33,716 
August 1947 2,976 24,569 
Source: Kay (1972), p.273. 
4.3 THE GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD 
4.3.1 Origins of the GCMB 
Some people think that the GCMB is simply a by-product of World 
War II (Wehner Jr., 1964, p.98), while others argue that it stems from 
the recommendations of the Nowell Commission of 1938 (Hopkins, 1973, 
p.264). Neither of these customary views is convincing for available 
evidence suggests that the origins of the GCMB predates both the Nowell 
Commission Report of 1939 and, therefore. World War II. 
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Hopkins (1973) suggested that the Marketing Boards of British West 
Africa were a part of a package of measures, which included tariff 
changes, designed to influence the performance of the West African economy 
after 1930. He asserted that the Marketing Board system was just one 
feature of a search for security which was the prime concern of Britain 
and, for that matter, France, in the years between the onset of the 
world slump of 1930 and World War II. 
'An important clue as to the origins of the GCMB and the 
NCMB,* often ignored is the fact that the French 
experimented with broadly similar arrangements in West 
Africa at an earlier date than did the British. It is 
known that as early as 1892 a limited range of measures 
aimed at protecting French exporters had been applied 
to certain French West African colonies and would have 
probably been extended had not Britain succeeded in 
1898 in negotiating an agreement which guaranteed equal 
treatment for her traders and goods in the Ivory Coast 
and Dahomey. These French controls over primary 
produce in West Africa were tightened after the First 
World War as a design to ensure that the colonies 
assisted the reconstruction of Franch after that war. ' 
(Hoskins, 1973) 
The world economic depression which began in the late 1920s led to 
virtual total controlled marketing of some important produce in French 
West Africa. The Caisses de Compensation were established for the 
export of rubber and coffee in 19 31, bananas in 1932 and vegetables in 
1933-34. Compensation funds were built up by levying a surcharge on 
foreign imports of these products at the port of entry in France, and 
were then paid out to support producer prices in the colonies when these 
fell below a certain minimum level. The aim, price stabilisation, was 
clearly a precursor of similar measures taken by Britain during and 
after the Second World War. 
* Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board. 
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The British leamt f rom the French and also being faced with the 
harsh 1930 depression, determined to implement similar controls over 
their vital West African produce. This exercise began with the 
Bartholomew Plan of 1931 which was rejected in West Africa. Next was 
the indirect and mild state control, recommended by the Nowell 
Commission in 1938. But the advent of World War II created a favourable 
climate for the successful implementation of the tougher governmental 
controls proposed. Finally, being determined to hold on to what had 
been their ambition for a long time, the British Government, long before 
the war ended, declared to the producers of cocoa in a white paper 
(His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946, p.l) its intention not to 
relinquish the wartime controls. The controls were to be operated by 
two new national boards: the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board and the 
Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board. (See Figure 4.1(C).) 
Thus the Second World War merely presented the opportunity for the 
GCMB to be created, while the Nowell Commission report merely served to 
provide the necessary legal rules for the otherwise rejected dictatorial 
plan of 1931. The origins of the GCMB could therefore be traced back 
to include all the following: 
1. The example of the French economic controls in West 
Africa since 1892-1934. 
2. The Bartholomew Plan of 1931. 
3. The recommendations of the Nowell Commission which 
inquired into cocoa marketing in British West Africa 
(1938). 
4. The so-called successful experimentation with wartime 
controls through the West African Cocoa Marketing Board. 
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Purpose and Object Ives of the GCMB 
When the GCMB was established in 1947, its main purpose was to 
insulate the Ghana cocoa farmer from the uncertainties of the world 
cocoa market. The Board would buy all locally produced cocoa at a 
relatively stable price and sell it on the world market at the usually 
fluctuating price. The ostensible reason for this arrangement was 
that: 
'Cocoa is a mainstay of thousands upon thousands of 
peasant farmers . . . and provides a livelihood for 
countless numbers of wage-labourers who are employed 
by the farmers in the maintenance of their farms and 
the harvesting of the crop. Cocoa is the great 
provider of external purchasing power, and in Ghana 
the budgetary position of the government depends to 
a very large degree on the prosperity of the cocoa 
industry.' 
(His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1944, p.l) 
It is therefore of great necessity to create a break between the price 
which the farmer received and that offered by the world market. 
4.3.3 Economic Objectives 
It must be emphasised that the economic objectives of the GCMB 
were not clearly spelt out. The bare statement of the purpose was 
not enough. It only opened the platform to management, governments, 
and interested individuals to guess along, which has not proved healthy 
for the Board. Amid this vagueness, however, two broad categories of 
economic objectives can be gathered from official records, statements 
and a posteriori reasoning. These categories are here designated 
'external' and 'domestic', the latter referring to the internal economy 
of Ghana. 
There were two main external objectives. The first was to guarantee 
British consumers adequate supplies of cocoa at a relatively low and 
stable price. It is common knowledge that after the Second World War 
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the cocoa supply situation was critical, unlike coffee which had ample 
carry-over stocks, and tea which was relatively easier to expand. 
Furthermore, the food uses of the cocoa bean had assumed increasing 
importance in a world still hungry and where rationing of cocoa was in 
force. Such rationing was recommended by the International Essential 
Food Committee (Wickizer, 1951). Therefore, rigid governmental control 
was even more necessary after the war in order to prevent the low 
supplies and increasing demand to escalate the price beyond the reach 
of the ordinary British consumer. 
Secondly, the Board was to provide Britain with foreign exchange, 
specifically United States dollars, which she urgently needed to import 
U.S. capital goods to rebuild her war-shattered economy (Fitch and 
Oppenheimer, 1968, p.45). The capital was to be realised through the 
holding of reserves which the Board would accumulate from the net 
proceeds from cocoa. Table 4.2 shows the annual reserves that Britain 
received as a result of the operation of the Board. Only a fraction 
of the dollar proceeds from cocoa was to be paid out to Ghana, while 
the rest went into blocked sterling balances (see Table 4.3 at the end 
of this chapter). Thus the external objectives were truly external 
to Ghana, since they were designed to assist the recovery of the 
metropolitan power with little consideration of Ghana's own interests. 
However, there were also a number of domestic economic objectives 
among which could be listed the aims: 
1. To stabilise the domestic price of cocoa in order 
to give the farmer a chance to plan his planting 
activity with greater confidence. 
2. To stabilise the farmer's income. This has not 
been explicitly stated in any ordinance, but it is 
always implied. 
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3. To accumulate funds for the financing of industry-
wide projects which could not be met by Individual 
effort, e.g., disease control, research, feeder 
road construction, social amenities for cocoa farming 
communities, etc. 
4. To accumulate funds which could be used to develop 
the country's economy in general. 
5. To control inflation through the Board's prices 
and total payment policies. 
6. To pursue international price stabilisation or 
national export earning maintenance. 
These aims, which are not without conflict, will be discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter. In order to understand the conflicts, it 
may also be necessary to review the characteristics and the composition 
of the Board. 
4.3.4. Characteristics and Composition of the GCMB 
Characteristics - John C. Abbott classified agricultural marketing 
boards into the following categories: advisory and promotional 
marketing boards; marketing boards for stabilising price without engaging 
in trade; marketing boards for stabilising price by trading alongside 
other enterprises; domestic monopoly marketing boards; regulatory 
marketing boards and export monopoly marketing boards (Abbott, 1967, 
p.705). 
The GCMB, since its inception, belongs to the last catetory of 
the above classification. Its characteristics still conform very 
closely to those defined below by Abbott, notwithstanding several 
amendments to its original ordinance. According to Abbott, the export 
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monopoly marketing board is the sole buyer and seller of specified 
products primarily produced for export, including raw produce sold to 
domestic enterprises for processing into commodities for export. In 
principle, the board is said to replace all firms formerly engaged in 
the export trade, but these firms may continue as the Board's domestic 
buying, processing and overseas selling agents. The board can also 
make domestic purchases through co-operatives and stations operated 
directly by the board. But export sales are made locally by the board 
or through selling agents on major international markets. The board 
may own or hire marketing facilities, installations and processing 
facilities, and the price stabilisation policy is normally based on 
fixed producer prices backed by reserve funds (Abbott, 1967, p.705). 
The GCMB's ordinance indeed embodies all of the above features. 
Composition ~ The original ordinance of 1947 provided for a total 
of twelve members on the Board distributed in the following way: a 
chairman, who was to be an official nominated by the Governor; three 
members appointed by the Governor, and four producers - two were to be 
nominated by the Governor on the recommendations of the Joint 
Provincial Council, and the other two nominated by the Governor on the 
recommendations of the Ashanti Confederacy Council. Two members were 
also to be nominated respectively by the Joint Provincial Council and 
the Ashanti Confederacy Council; one member to be nominated by the 
chambers of commerce in Ghana and one member to be nominated by the 
cocoa manufacturers with buying establishments in Ghana (Johnson, 1958, 
p.5). 
As can be seen, the above composition represented the interests 
of government, manufacturers and the farmers. But after 1960 the class 
distinctions were dropped. The GCMB had only six members, all of whom 
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were appointed by the government by 1963 - a chairman, the General 
Manager of the GCMB, the General Secretary of the Farmers' Council, 
the Produce Manager and one representative each from the Ministries of 
Finance and Trade. This does not, by any means, imply that the three 
interested groups have developed a common interest; it was because the 
government's interests overpower those of the other two partners. 
4.3.5 Functions and Powers of the GCMB 
Functions - The Cocoa Marketing Board's ordinance of 1947 clearly 
stated the functions fo the GCMB in article 6, sub-section 1, thus: 
'It shall be the duty of the Board to secure the most 
favourable arrangements for the purchase, grading, export 
and selling of Ghana cocoa and to assist in the develop-
ment by all possible means of the industry of Ghana for 
the benefit and prosperity of the producers.' 
(Bauer, 1954, p.280) 
Powers - Subsection 2 of article 6 of the 1947 GCMB ordinance also 
stated the powers of the Board: 
'In particular and without prejudice to the generality 
of the foregoing, the Board shall have power -
a) To control and fix the prices to be paid from 
time to time to Ghanaian producers for their 
cocoa and similarly to arrange in such manner 
as the Board shall think fit, to notify such 
prices; 
b) To purchase cocoa and do all things necessary 
for and in connection with the purchase from 
producers of Ghana cocoa; 
c) To appoint licensed buying agents for the 
purchase of cocoa on behalf of the Board; 
d) To grant, renew or withhold licences for each 
crop year to such agents, to impose conditions 
upon the grant of such licences, and to cancel 
or suspend any such licences for breach of any 
such conditions or other good cause; 
e) To sell cocoa and do all things necessary for 
and in connection with the selling, exporting, 
shipping and storage of Ghana cocoa (Bauer, 1954, p.281); 
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f) For in connection with any of the purposes of 
this ordinance and with the prior approval of the 
Government deal w i t h , sell or otherwise turn to 
account any stocks, shares, or securities of any 
company established under the Companies Act in 
Great Britain or in the United States of America 
the activities of which are limited by its 
constitution to the operations necessary for the 
importing, storage, exporting, shipping, selling 
or dealing in cocoa. 
(1951 amendment to 1947 ordinance) 
From and after the commencement of this ordinance: 
1. No person shall purchase cocoa except -
a) The Board, or a person authorised to purchase 
cocoa for sale to the; or a 
b) licensed buying agent or a person authorised 
to purchase for sale to such an agent; or a 
c) person acting upon the written instructions 
of the Board. 
2. No person shall export any cocoa except -
a) Cocoa which is property of the Board; or 
b) Cocoa the export of which has been authorised.' 
(Gold Coast Cocoa Ordinance, 1947) 
4.3.6 Producer Price Policy of the GCMB 
A successful operation of an export monopoly cum price stabilis-
ation marketing board in order to realise its economic objectives, 
depends very much upon the type of producer price policy pursued. The 
case of the GCMB, which intended to fulfil the above rather unweildy 
objectives enumerated under section 4.4c, the question of what 
producer price policy to follow and how to manage it has ever remained 
crucial and a thorny problem. 
If the GCMB objectives were only to stabilise the producer price, 
or income, to finance industry-wide projects, and to develop the 
industry, one could contend that the simple manipulation of subsidies, 
taxes and duties could have efficiently served. Alternatively, a 
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reserve price policy could have also been suitable, as it is with the 
Australian Wool Corporation (1974/75). 
However, the objectives have not been as few and as simple as 
that. Such objectives as the accumulation of reserves (for whatever 
purpose) complicated matters and hence precluded the choice of the 
contention above. 
The compromise that stemmed from the muddled objectives has been 
to pursue a less than 100 per cent pay-out policy to producers, in order 
to be able to hold reserves for the fulfilment of objectives other than 
those related to producers' incomes. At the beginning of each crop 
season therefore, the percentage pay-out is decided by the Board, based 
on ad hoc considerations such as the state of the market for the crop, 
the size of the stabilisation fund required, competition from 
alternative sources of employment, the level of domestic inflationary 
pressures, and the general political pattern of the time. Once the 
producer price was fixed, it obtained throughout the season (Ghana 
Cocoa Marketing Board, 1968, p.6). The policy of withholding some of 
the farmers' income has been thought to be justified by the authorities, 
as a vocal one-time member of the Board said: 
'The Board was in the position of a mother to the farmers. 
If a mother had a large jar of oil did she give it all 
to the children at once? If she did, they would be sick. 
The mother who gave the oil out carefully and protected 
her children from harmful effects was the one who would 
command the respect of her children in the long run. 
So it was with the Board.' 
W.J.M. Cheeseman 
(Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board News Letter, 1969) 
In a policy statement regarding the GCMB, the Ghana Government Minister 
of Finance laid down among other policies the following on producer 
price: 
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1. The producer price should be changed as rarely as 
possible to allow stable long term expectations 
and prevent domestic price level fluctuations. 
2. The long term producer price level should be 72/-
per load. This was later reduced to 60/- per load 
from 1959 because the farmers supposedly agreed 
voluntarily to each give up 12/- towards the 
implementation of the National Development plan. 
3. All boom incomes were to be impounded by the 
Government (through duties) and the Board (through 
surpluses) to be followed by gradual use of those 
reserves in the interests of all Ghanaians (not 
specifically of cocoa producers). 
(Green, 1961, p.20) 
The above statements have guided the producer price policy since 
1954. 
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TABLE 4.2 
THE GCMB AND GHANAIAN RESERVES, 1948-1957 
(£ million) 
Year 
Total GCMB Paid to cocoa 
proceeds producers 
Total Ghanaian 
reserves 
(London) 
1948 41.5 15.4 n. a. 
1949 37.5 21.2 n.a. 
1950 45.1 21.2 113.3 
1951 70.3 34.2 137.2 
1952 51.6 31.4 145.1 
1953 57.1 32.5 160.1 
1954 74.7 28.0 197.4 
1955 77.5 29.5 208.2 
1956 52.3 35.0 189.8 
1957 50.7 39.9 171.4 
Source: Fitch and Oppenheimer (1968) , p.45. 
TABLE 4.3 
GHANAIAN DOLLAR ALLOCATIONS, 1951-1954 
Year 
Value of Ghana exports 
to dollar area 
(£) 
Percentage of dollar 
earnings allocated 
in Ghana 
1951 30,047,000 17 
1952 25,539,000 18 
1953 25,407,000 21 
1954 20,009,000 16 
Source: Fitch and Oppenheimer (1968) , p.46. 
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FIGURE 4.1 
MAEKETING CHANNELS FOR GHANA COCOA, 1900-1974 
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Note: The marketing channel followed by the GCMB is that of (C) above, except that agents headquarters station is 
deleted. This system underwent a dramatic change between 1960 and 1965 when the United Ghana Farmers 
co-operatives by statute were the sole agents between the GCMB and the producers. c 
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CHAPTER 5 
ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONFLICT 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
It should be here reiterated that the GCMB from its inception was 
ordered -
'to secure the most favourable arrangement for the purchase, 
grading, export and selling of Ghana cocoa, and to assist 
in the development by all means possible of the cocoa 
industry of Ghana for the benefit and prosperity of the 
producers.' (Gold Coast Cocoa Ordinance, 1947) 
The above description of the Board's duties is not in any way in order 
of merit or priority. If any priority can be attached to them at all, 
that part of the ordinance which states -
'to assist in the development by all means possible of the 
cocoa industry of Ghana' 
should be the cardinal duty of the GCMB. From its success in this 
regard, we can make judgments about the value of the Board to both the 
cocoa industry itself and to the general economy of Ghana. 
The development of the cocoa industry in the Ghanaian situation 
implies the expansion of supply to the ultimate levels desired by both 
the farmers and the nation, for the maximisation of the industry and 
national benefits. This level has not yet been attained. Furthermore, 
the industry failed to take advantage of the boom prices of the last 
decade; a decade of unequalled foreign exchange shortages in Ghana. 
Our study in this chapter concentrates upon examining the objectives 
of the GCMB in the light of the evidence presented in the preceding 
chapters. Any concentration upon short term national budgetary and 
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foreign exchange emergencies as the main economic goal of the Board 
may involve it in sacrifices of production and revenue in the long run. 
This certainly would conflict with the farmers' interests which are the 
guarantee of maximum incomes over time. In considering these problems, 
we can draw some conclusions with respect to the conditions of the 
Ghana (and world) cocoa industries: 
(i) there is still profitable room for more cocoa to be 
supplied to the world market at current or higher 
levels of costs (Chapter 1); 
(ii) cocoa production Ghana entails rising real and 
opportunity costs, i.e., in terms of the resources 
employed - land, labour and capital (Chapter 2); 
(iii) the supply of cocoa in Ghana is positively responsive 
to economic incentives such as the price paid to the 
cocoa growers (Chapter 3); 
(iv) the Ghana cocoa industry is legally and firmly 
placed in the monopoly hands of the GCMB, whose 
duty it is to maximise industry benefits (Chapter 4). 
These conclusions challenge the credibility of the GCMB and it 
remains to be seen how the Board has structured its interests and 
objectives to meet these challenges. 
5,1 EXAMINATION OF GCMB'S OBJECTIVES AND A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
OF THEIR EFFECT UPON COCOA PRODUCTION 
A closer look divides the GCMB's objectives into three groups 
in terms of their effect upon the flow of resources in the industry. 
For example, some objectives of the Board effect resources (cash or 
otherwise) to flow into the industry; others effect resources (cash 
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Initially), to flow out of the Industry, either temporarily or 
permanently. 
For ease of the exposition and the analysis of the conflicts 
between the various groups of objectives, it is assumed that the industry 
has linear supply and demand functions. Furthermore, as a norm, the 
GCMB can fix producer prices at a long run average which prevents 
accumulation (or loss) of funds. 
5.1.1 Objectives which retain or effect Resources to flow 
into the Industry 
The Board's interest in financing industry-wide projects and 
programs, e.g., money spent on research into cocoa diseases or quick 
and high-yielding tree varieties, the construction of feeder roads into 
cocoa growing areas and the provision of community services (hospitals, 
clinics, schools, etc.) in cocoa villages, fall into this first group. 
This group of objectives shall subsequently be known as 'permanent 
injections'. 
Permanent injections of resources into the industry are mainly of 
two types. First, there are injections of money by the Board and 
government in the form of subsidies on fertilisers and seeds, or bonuses 
paid to farmers; these have the effect of cheapening the inputs for 
cocoa producers. Secondly, the provision of free extension services 
of the Board and the government and the dissemination of new ideas 
pertaining to cocoa diseases, quick and high-yielding cocoa tree 
varieties from (Board financed) research stations help raise the level 
of efficiency of production in the industry and promote the adoption 
of new technology. 
FIGURE 5.1 
EFFECT OF PERMANENT INJECTIONS ON COCOA PRODUCTION 
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The ultimate effect of a reduction In costs coupled with a rise In 
efficiency in production Is to shift the supply curve of the Industry to 
the right (Tlsdell, 1972, p.68). With reference to the assumptions made 
earlier, we can dlagrammatlcally illustrate the effects of permanent 
injections (see Figure 5.1, p.94). 
In Figure 5.1, D^ D^ is the world demand curve for Ghana cocoa and as 
such is the average revenue (AR) curve facing the industry. S S is the 
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supply curve or the Industry marginal cost (MC) curve for Ghana cocoa. 
P^ is the GCMB's prescribed producer price which is, by assumption, eqioal 
to the world average equilibrium price for Ghana cocoa for the entire 
period of producer price stabilisation. Q^ is the corresponding 
equilibrium quantity of Ghana cocoa supplied. 
If for reasons given earlier, a shift occurred in the supply curve, 
i.e., from S^ S^ to S^ S^, in Figure 5.1, the supply of Ghana cocoa 
would inc rease from Q to Q2» given that the GCMB's prescribed producer 
price remains at P^. Aggregate producer Income (total quantity x 
producer price) would also rise from Q^ P^ to Q^ P^. But in the absence 
of any international price agreement to support the price at P^, or 
adequate storage facilities for stockpiling excesses, the world price 
for Ghana cocoa would decline to P^, if demand remains constant. 
Thus, while permanent injections would give growers an Increase in 
the producer surplus (this Increase being equal to the area of a b c d 
in Figure 5.1), the GCMB and the government could lose income to the 
value of a b f e if the Increased production is forced to be exported 
at P^ due to low demand conditions. The potential loss (a b f e), is 
comprised of a subsidy of a e f and a b c on the consumer and producer 
surplus respectively. This problem is similar to the long-run price 
support problem caused by declining demand, as it will be noticed in 
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the discussions of temporary withdrawals. 
In order that the Board avoid the loss of a b e f while pursuing 
the policy of permanent injections, the International Cocoa Agreement 
entered into in 1972 should be maintained or else adequate storage 
facilities for stockpiling must be developed. We now turn to a 
discussion of the effects of temporary withdrawals. 
5.1.2 Objectives which effect the temporary withdrawal of 
Resources from the Industry 
The Board's producer price stabilisation objective which entails 
withholding part of the farmers' income during periods of high world 
prices and returning it to the farmers during season of low prices, 
belongs to this second group. This group hereafter will be called 
'temporary withdrawals'. 
Temporary withdrawals are said to be necessary because of world 
market price fluctuations which could adversely affect the incomes of 
cocoa farmers. The proponents of these withdrawals believe that a 
reserve fund for the stabilisation of producer price and income would 
give the farmers long-term expectations for planting decisions to be 
made with greater confidence (Ady, 1953, pp.604-605). Although 
temporary withdrawals have some positive results on production, they 
nevertheless have negative effects as well, upon the expansion of 
production and incomes in the Ghana cocoa industry beyond the equili-
brium defined by the stable price to the growers. 
To analyse the effects of these withdrawals upon output and 
aggregate producer income, it is assumed that seasonal variations in 
the world price of cocoa are caused either by shifts in the demand or 
the supply curves for Ghana cocoa or a combination of such shifts. 
Figures 5.3(A) and (B) below, illustrate this assumption. 
FIGURES 5.2(A) AND (B) 
VARIATIONS IN COCOA PRICE DUE TO SHIFTS IN DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
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CASE 5.2(A) 
DEMAND SHIFT 
Qo 2^ 
CASE 5.2(B) 
SUPPLY SHIFT 
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In both 5.2(A) and 5.2(B) above, D^ D^ through D^ D^ are the world 
demand curves for Ghana cocoa. S^ S^ through S^ S^ are the supply 
curves for Ghana cocoa. P^ through P^, and Q^ through Q^, are the 
corresponding equilibrium prices and quantities supplied respectively. 
P^ is the prescribed growers' price. In both (A) and (B), P^ would vary 
through P^ if D^ D^ and S^ S^ shifted through D^ D^ and S^ S^ 
respectively. 
Output Effect: 
In case 5.2(A), the quantity of cocoa that growers would supply if 
the producer price were stabilised at P^ would always be Q^, all things 
being equal. 
This apparent stagnation is inherent with producer price 
stabilisation policies. The additional incentive which usually results 
from a price rise is not (always) enjoyed immediately by the growers for, 
by definition, the rise above the prescribed price is withheld by the 
marketing authority in the form of the stabilisation reserves (which 
necessarily exists with the operation of the stabilisation policy). 
On the other hand, a fall in the world price, below P^, does not adversely 
affect the farmers immediately because the lower world price would be 
supplemented from the stabilisation reserves. In total, therefore, 
the farmers remain indifferent to price changes and hence production 
remains at Q^ always. 
In case 5.2(B), however, the equilibrium quantity that growers 
would supply depends upon the location of the supply function which, in 
turn, depends upon the behaviour of costs in the industry. If costs, 
for example, are falling, the equilibrium supply at P^ could be anywhere 
to the right of Q^, e.g., Q^, but would be to the left of Q^ if costs 
are increasing, e.g., Q^. 
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Thus, temporary withdrawals stabilise output for short periods 
under constant costs, but destabilises output when costs are unstable. 
Price and Income Effect: 
Under case 5.2(A), both producer price and income stabilise, but 
only for a relatively short period. In the long run both of them become 
impossible to stabilise concurrently. For instance, if the farmers are 
still encouraged to maintain their original level of Q^ while the world 
price is P^ (i.e., in a declining demand situation), the excess of Q^ 
to Q^ (Figure 5.2(A)) would depress the world price further to P^. 
This is due to the fact that the GCMB and other agricultural marketing 
Boards, particularly those in tropical countries, do not currently have 
adequate storage facilities to stockpile their excess supplies. Any 
marketing authority would become bankrupt if it continued for a long 
period to pay the growers P^, while receiving P^ on the world market. 
Producer price and income stabilisation policies would therefore be 
abandoned when the marketing authority became bankrupt in the long run. 
Thus, if year to year export price instability is caused by 
consumer demand shifts, price and income stabilisation policies are 
possible but are clearly impossible in combatting a long run decline 
in demand. Support during such a decline implies the permanent 
injections discussed earlier. 
The impracticability of achieving both price and income 
stabilisation when the instability is caused by seasonal shifts in 
supply (e.g., for climatic reasons), is clear from Figure 5.2(B). 
This is because the supply shifts themselves, while they destabilise 
prices (e.g., prices fluctuate from P^, through P^ on the vertical 
axis), stabilise incomes since incomes are given by the area P x Q 
and prices and quantity move in opposite directions. Only one of 
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them may therefore be achieved in any one period, and even then that 
of completely stable income must be under a unit elasticity of demand 
assumption. A marketing board's policy to stabilise prices where 
there are annual shifts in the supply will certainly destabilise incomes. 
However, whether income stabilisation is a desirable objective is open 
to debate. The policy of income stabilisation might gain support, if 
incomes are high, from people who would like to see the farmers enjoy 
high incomes. But they would disapprove of stabilising the growers" 
incomes at lower levels if there are chances for upward growth of 
incomes. 
But, while it is not very clear whether price stabilisation for 
the purpose of stabilising producers' incomes is desirable or not; 
Massel (1974, p.280) has demonstrated that both the consumers and the 
producers would gain from price stabilisation. His analysis was in 
terms of the consumer and the producer surplus gained. The gain is 
equivalent to the sum of a b c and c d e in Figure 5.2(C). 
In Figure 5.2(C), P^ and P^ are two unstable prices which are 
assumed to occur with a probability of .5 each. Through a buffer 
stock, prices can be stabilised at P^. At the stable price P^, the net 
gain therefore is a b c plus c d e. However, in terms of gains to the 
producers, much will depend upon either a commodity agreement whereby 
all supply would be at the price P^, or upon a positive shift of the 
demand curve D D in order to absorb the level of production o o 
described by point d, or in the absence of both the agreement and 
autonomous increases in demand, the ability of the marketing authority 
to stockpile excess supplies. 
FIGURE 5.2(C) 
PRICE INSTABILITY IN A PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKET 
iUi 
Price 
^Juantity 
Source: Massel (1974) 
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Now, relating the theoretical discussions of the output and income 
effect of temporary withdrawals to the empirical information on the 
subject, it can be said that the Ghana cocoa industry is largely 
dominated by instability caused by supply fluctuations. This can be seen 
by comparing the relative fluctuations (coefficient of variation = S/X) 
in prices and incomes for the producers and at the export level. 
The following coefficients of variation were calculated from 
Table 5.3: 
V^p = 0.31 
Vpp = 0.17 
VpE = 0-28 
where. 
V ^ = coefficient of variation in export earnings from cocoa. 
V ^ = coefficient of variation in export prices. 
Vpp = coefficient of variation in producer prices. 
Vpg = coefficient of variation in aggregate producer earnings. 
Since V < V it implies that the GCMB has more successfully r F Xir 
stabilised producer price than export price. But V ^ < Vp^ implies that 
aggregate producer incomes were less stable than export earnings and 
producer prices. Vpp < Vp^, supports the observation (in Figure 5.2(B)) 
that although the producer price may be fixed at P^, instability in 
producer incomes would still be high. Case 5.2(B) is therefore the more 
suitable description of the Ghana cocoa industry. In view of the above 
conclusion, any arguments for temporary withdrawals of resources in 
order to stabilise incomes have, for the past, been irrelevant because 
Ghana had no control over the movement of D^ D^, nor had adequate storage 
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facilities for stockpiling. The logical question that then arises is 
whether price stabilisation by itself (which is achievable) was necessary 
at all since it is only a means to an end - stable producer incomes. If 
price stabilisation is to benefit the producers, it ought to imply the 
maximisation of both producer prices and incomes. So far, this has not 
been the case in the Ghanaian industry. Price stabilisation indeed 
became the fixing of a ceiling to the domestic cocoa prices and conse-
quently the cocoa farmers' returns. Appendix 5.B shows that producer 
incomes in the past adjusted by the price index have declined. The 
recent International Cocoa Agreement now offers hope for price 
stabilisation in the future to be more beneficial. We now turn to 
investigate the effects of the last group of objectives. 
5.1.3. Objectives which cause the permanent withdrawal of 
Resources from the Industry 
Arising from the fear of creating inflationary pressures in the 
economy, the Board and the government agreed to syphon off some of the 
* 
boom prices through the manipulation of export duties and taxes. 
This constitutes loss of revenue to the growers. Also the GCMB's 
desire to make grants to institutions (government and private alike) 
which are outside the industry, and the statutory commitment of the 
entire GCMB's profits to the general development of the national economy 
Schedule of export duties for given world market cocoa prices 
declared since 1954 in Ghana: 
f.o.b. price 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 520 560 600 
Export duty 8% 10% 14% 18% 22% 25% 27% 29% 31% 36% 40% 
Net available 
price 184 216 241 262 281 300 321 341 359 358 360 
Note; f.o.b. price/tonne in New Cedis, £l = NC2.00 
Source: Ghana Economic Bulletin (May, 1961), Vol.5, No.l. 
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since 1965 are permanent drains upon the cocoa Industry's resources. 
These will be called 'permanent withdrawals'. 
As it is with temporary withdrawals, the effect of permanent 
withdrawals upon output is either neutral or negative. 
The amount of revenue withdrawn permanently is a function of the 
excess of the world price over the GCMB's prescribed producer price, 
less the temporary withdrawals. But since 1965 it has been the total 
sales of cocoa less the cost of marketing, the Board being prohibited 
from holding reserves after 1965. The withdrawal of profits (potential 
income to producers) from an industry that is positively responsive to 
price incentives, and furthermore, an industry that is facing increasing 
costs of production, imposes limitations on the industry's potential for 
expansion. 
The problem is illustrated in Figure 5.3 where it is assumed that 
the world price of cocoa rose from P^ to P^ due to a shift in the demand 
curve to the right and that the total increase in receipts is withdrawn 
for use in other sectors of the economy. The effect then of the rise 
in price and the accompaning withdrawal would be that growers would 
continue to produce at Q^ but not Q^ ^ as it would have normally been. 
The GCMB would, however, sell the sub-optimal output Q^, at P2 on 
the world market. Higher per unit profit would thus be made by the 
Board, but it would be at the risk of stifling the growth of the Ghana 
cocoa market, and encouraging increased production by competitors. 
In Figure 5.4 it is assumed that S^ S^ has shifted to S^ S^, due 
to an increase in costs of production in the industry. The equilibrium 
quantity of supply by the growers at the price P^ thus falls from Q^ to 
Q^. Again, the Board would reap higher per unit profit at the output 
level of Q^. But the farmers would now suffer a reduction in their 
FIGURE 5.3 
NEUTRAL OUTPUT EFFECT OF PERMANENT WITHDRAWALS 
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FIGURE 5.4 
NEGATIVE OUTPUT EFFECT OF PERMANENT WITHDRAWALS 
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aggregate incomes because their new equilibrium output Q^ is lower 
than the original Q^. 
The GCMB is an oligopolist in the world cocoa market. But in the 
domestic economy its position is rather hard to define. To the 
individiial farmer the Board, for instance, is a monopsonist because the 
farmer, by statute, sells all his produce to the Board. However, to 
the nation, the Board is a monopolist because the Board,by statute, is 
charged with the development by all possible means of the cocoa industry 
of Ghana. All the organisations and/or units in the country which are 
involved in cocoa production have been placed under its control, e.g., 
the Cocoa Production Division, the Produce Inspection and Grading 
Services, the Cocoa Research Institute at Tafo, the Special 
Rehabilitation Projects, the Cocoa Products Company, the Produce Buying 
Agency Ltd and the Cocoa Marketing Company Ltd., etc. The provision of 
credit (bonuses and subsidies) to farmers, the provision of research 
facilities and information to growers, extension services, feeder roads, 
transportation of the farmers' produce, etc., have so implicated the 
Board in the growers' production decision processes. Above all, the 
Board, without prior bargaining with the farmers, fixes the price to be 
paid to the farmers for their crop in each season. Therefore, the GCMB 
though in theory a monopsonist is, in effect, a monopolist, for it does 
more than a pure monopsonist does in determining the supply of cocoa in 
the country. This complex and tremendous influence of the Board upon 
production decisions justifies its being taken for a domestic monopoly 
in addition to the fact that the Board is the most important partner of 
the world oligopoly for cocoa which emphasises its domestic monopopodos-
tic position. 
Thus concluded, the GCMB's position, in theory, involves it in 
conflicts in periods when substantial increases in production are said 
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FIGURE 5.5 
COCOA OUTPUT RESTRICTION UNDER IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
Price 
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to be necessary, for the theory of in perfect competition states that 
such a producer restricts his output to maintain a high market price. 
(See Figure 5.5.) 
In Figure 5.5, Q^ is the competitive equilibrium supply of cocoa, 
"^ m ^^^ supply of cocoa by the producer who equates the marginal 
revenue with marginal cost in order to maximise profits. P and P are 
c m 
the competitive and monopolistic prices for Ghana cocoa respectively. 
But P^ is the growers' price. 
The difference between OQ and 0Q„ is the quantity of cocoa withheld C M 
by the Marketing Board. The GCMB's monopoly power is exercised in paying 
the cocoa growers a price (P^), which is less than the competitive price 
(P ) (Figure 5.5). This holds back production by Q Q . At the same c m c 
time, demand for Ghana cocoa stops at 0Q„ because of the rise of the M 
export price from P to P due to the restriction. 
c m 
P. T. Bauer (1952 and 1954), In a number of articles, and in his 
celebrated book West African Trade condemned the holding of reserves 
by the GCMB (without any specified period for the stabilisation) as 
amounting to a socialisation of the cocoa farmers' income, or, if it 
was anything else, then it was simply an unfairly disproportionate 
taxation of a section of the Ghanaian community. Milton Friedman (1954) 
also argued that even temporary withdrawals from the industry by the 
GCMB implied a forced lending without interest rates by the farmers to 
the GCMB. He believed that this intervention by state power in the 
working of the free market system would result in a reduction in 
production and a consequent reduction in the world's welfare. But a 
diametrically opposite view is held by Niculescu (1954) who wanted to 
see the cocoa farmers relinquish more of their incomes for the benefit 
of the rest of the nation. For, as he said: 
liO 
'the cocoa fanners were also aware of the fact - and 
so is everybody else in the country - that the cocoa 
farmers' high present-day income is, on the whole, 
not due to greater initiative or to harder work than 
the rest of the population, but is mainly the result 
of a combination of greatly increased world demand 
and favourable climatic and soil factors for which 
the cocoa farmers cannot claim much credit, except of 
having ancestors who settled in the right regions.' 
These opposing views will be examined later in the analysis. 
The problem of the GCMB's position as the sole legal buyer of 
Ghana's cocoa should be considered within the context of whether a 
centralised marketing system is preferable to a more competitive enter-
prise system of development for the Ghanaian cocoa industry. The free 
trade supply (Q^), for instance (Figure 5.5), may not be optimal for 
the nation in terms of resources used and receipts obtained (see Corden, 
1974). The question then would not be whether resources should be 
withdrawn but, rather, how much funds should be withdrawn in order to 
effect an optimal development of production in the industry. This 
would depend upon the elasticities of demand and supply for Ghana cocoa. 
Since the demand for Ghana cocoa is mainly external, the discussion on 
withdrawals takes us into the realm of 'optimum export tariff arguments', 
i.e., 'the terms of trade argument of export tariffs'. As more than 
60 per cent of Ghana's foreign exchange earnings comes from cocoa 
exports, it would require that any conclusions reached must be justified 
in terms of foreign exchange obtained. In the discussions that follow, 
all potential incomes to the cocoa growers withheld either as profits 
of the Board, or local export taxes including all other compulsory 
payments, shall be considered to be export taxes on the cocoa industry 
because they are incomes lost by the producers. 
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5.2 OPTIMUM EXPORT TAX ON GHANA COCOA 
Although the literature on export taxes is vast, the current topic 
is discussed within the framework of the recent writing of Corden (1974). 
An alternative method could have been that of Blandford (1974): 'The 
analysis of buffer fund price stabilisation by export monopoly marketing 
agencies in developing countries'. Another method of discussing the 
optimisation of export earnings from cocoa in Ghana could have been that 
of Blomqvist (1973): "An approach to an optimal cocoa policy for Ghana". 
However, both the Blandford and Blomqvist methods require data which are 
currently not available. Moreover, these two methods are currently 
under scrutiny, hence any results by them could come under greater 
suspicion. Thus, for both the sagacity of Corden's argument and its 
suitability to the available data, it is preferable for the present task 
of this paper. 
According to Corden, the terms of trade argument for taxes on 
exports is that if the elasticity of demand (|ri|) for the export is 
less than unity, it will pay (Ghana) to restrict the quantity of 
export (cocoa), since export income will be raised while fewer resources 
are used for export production. It would even pay to restrict supply 
when the export demand elasticity is greater than unity; but he warned 
that this trade restriction cannot be unlimited for, if no trade remains, 
there can be no benefit from improved terms of trade. An optimum degree 
of cocoa production restriction exists at which the marginal gain from 
improved terms of trade is just equal to the marginal loss from reduced 
use of the international division of labour. We wish to locate that 
point on a diagram. 
With reference to Figure 5.5 above, the domestic supply curve S^ S^ 
shows that marginal cost (MC) of supplying various quantities of cocoa 
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for export. At the free trade point (Z) this MC is equal to average 
revenue (AR) and not marginal revenue (MR). Thus, the marginal rate of 
transforming exportables into importables at home and abroad are not 
equal, and so free trade is not optimal. So it is in Ghana's interests 
to behave like a monopolist and restrict the export supply of cocoa 
until MR = MC. (The GCMB may well fit in here to play the restriction 
role.) 
The optimum situation is where exports are OQ^ and the price has 
risen to OP . This is obtained by an export tax rate of P P /OP . The ™ m o m 
optimum supply point on D D is then m (Corden, 1974). 
5.2.1 Formula for Optimum Tax on Exports 
The elasticity of demand for Ghana cocoa at point m is OP /P P ; m m o 
i.e., average revenue divided by the excess of average over marginal 
revenue (i.e., AR/(AR-MR)). If the optimum export tax rate (t^) at 
m = P P /OP , and the elasticity of demand (n^) for Ghana cocoa at m o m i 
point m = OP /P P , then the optimum tax on cocoa export is (t^) = m m o " ^ i' 
This is the formula for the optimum export tax formulated by Corden 
using imports as the numeraire. Thus, if one knew the elasticity of 
demand for the export, the optimum tax rate could be calculated. For 
instance, at the level of demand (Q^) in Figure 5.5, where the absolute 
value of the elasticity is equal to 1, because MR=0, the optimum tax 
rate is (t^) = y = This is interpreted to mean that the tax rate at 
(QJ is 100 per cent. The farmers theoretically would be left with 
zero income at Q^. The formula also seems to imply that the optimum tax 
rate would be greater than 100 per cent when < 1, but such a tax 
is not possible. Corden argued that one cannot tax away more than the 
whole export income. The optimum tax, he said, is exactly 100 per cent 
as along as < 1- The logic is that as the tax rate is raised 
FIGURE 5.6 
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND AND THE TAX RATE 
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Source; Corden (1974). 
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towards 100 per cent the elasticity will rise so that the optimum tax 
rate will fall below 100 per cent. Diagraramatically, his argument is 
as shown in Figure 5.6. 
The curve QQ shows that the elasticity rises as the tax is raised. 
At the zero tax (free trade) point, equivalent to Z in Figure 5.5, the 
n^ is less than unity, namely OQ. When the tax is ON the elasticity is 
unity (the point of (Q^) in Figure 5.5). 
The curve JJ is the relationship derived from the optimum tax 
formula t^ = It shows that the optimum tax is 100 per cent when the 
elasticity is unity and is zero when the elasticity is infinite. The 
curve JJ drops vertically when t^ = 100 rather than continuing to the 
right as the formular suggests. 
Having established the theoretical formula for determining the 
optimum export tax for the maximisation of foreign exchange earnings by 
the GCMB, the next task is to calculate the demand elasticity for Ghana 
cocoa so that when fitted into Corden's formula we can compare the 
current actual tax rate to the theoretical optimum tax rate. 
5.3 ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR GHANA COCOA 
There have not been as many attempts at estimating the price 
elasticity of demand for Ghana cocoa as there have been for the price 
elasticity of supply. One notable work, however, is that by Blomqvist 
and Haessel (1972) (both of the University of Ghana, Legon). 
Blomqvist and Haessel developed their measure of elasticity as 
follows: 
n^ ^ - \ ... (5.1) 
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where, 
"^ G " price elasticity of demand for Ghana cocoa. 
Qg = supply of Ghana cocoa. 
\ = world price elasticity of demand for all sources of cocoa. 
Og = Ghama's share of the world's supply of cocoa. 
The major problem with this formulation is that it does not take into 
account the effect of the supply of cocoa from Ghana's competitors. 
Their reason for this was that there was a relatively high correlation 
between changes in Ghana cocoa output and output changes in many other 
producing countries. This could be right; but the correlation could be 
negative, and not positive as they implied for the long run trend. 
Development of cocoa production as reported by the UNCTAD secretariate 
shows that Ghana's performance differs from her competitors (see 
Table 5.1 below). While the others are developing at a high rate, 
Ghana is not. 
TABLE 5.1 
WORLD RATE OF GROWTH FOR COCOA PRODUCTION 
Year Ghana Nigeria Brazil Ivory Coast Cameroon Others Total 
1949/50-51/52 
to 4.9 5.1 2.0 4.3 4.7 3.7 4.2 
1959/60-61/62 
1959/60-61/62 
to 0.8 5.3 2.3 9.3 4.4 2.3 2.9 
1969/70-71/72 
1949/50-51/52 
to 2.8 4.4 2.1 6.8 4.6 3.0 3.5 
1969/70-71/72 
Source: UNCTAD Secretariate (1973). 
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Thus, for Blomqvist and Haessel to ignore the influence of supplies 
from competing countries on the elasticity of demand facing Ghana, is 
actually an understatement of the true elasticity of demand for Ghana 
cocoa. 
A more accurate formula for calculating the elasticity of demand 
facing an individual country in the world market is that by Linder (1967) 
and Etherington (1972, pp.101—103). The present discussion would prefer 
to go along with their method to estimate the elasticity of demand for 
Ghana cocoa. The Linder and Etherington formulation states that the 
elasticity of demand facing an individual nation in the world market is 
a direct function of the world price elasticity of demand plus the 
elasticity of supply of that commodity by the rest of the world. 
. n = IL -
^i ki ki 
where. 
n^ = is the elasticity of demand facing country (i). 
n = is the world price elasticity of demand (ri<o) . 
ki = is the country's (is) share of the world market (o<ki<i) 
k = is the rest of the world' share (k+ki=l). 
E = is the rest of the world's supply elasticity. 
The derivation of this equation is given in Etherington (1972) and 
is reproduced here for clarity. The derivation starts with the 
partitioning of world supply (q) between a specific country and 
the rest of the world (qr). 
qi = q - qr 
d£i ^ da _ iar 
dp dp dp 
where, 
P = world price of the commodity. 
and, 
dp qi dp qi dp qi 
therefore, q / i _ d a r . P 
"i ' dp qr qi 
but n . - f i - i 
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On the basis of the Linder and Etherington formulation, 
elasticities of demand for Ghana cocoa in each of the crop years 
1947/A8 to 1964/65 have been calculated. These are shown in column 5 
of Table 5.4. These elasticities were applied to the Corden formulation 
determining optimal withdrawals from an export industry and the results 
are also shown in column 6 of Table 5.4. Multiplying the results of 
column 6 by the total export earnings from cocoa in each corresponding 
year in column 2 of Table 5.2, withdrawals, in terms of cash, were also 
estimated. These are shown in column 8. 
In calculating the elasticity of demand for Ghana cocoa (upon which 
this analysis depends), the world elasticity of demand for cocoa (r|)is 
known to have declined over time. This decline, however, is assumed for 
analytical convenience to follow a step function between amarket suirveys. 
The assumption depended upon research work done by various people and 
organisations on the world elasticity of demand for cocoa since 1947. 
For instance, n was assumed to be constant at 0.55 between 1947/48 and 
1955, based upon Viton's estimation of this in 1955, using earlier 
figures (Birmingham, 1966, p. 373). Between 1961 and 1968, n was also 
assumed to be constant based upon the findings of this by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (Weymar, 1968). Between 1968 and 1974, n was 
held constant at 0.25,* arising from the UNCTAD committee on commodities 
estimate of it (UN Secretariate, 1973). However, because there was no 
information on n for the period 1955 to 1960, n was arbitrarily scaled 
down by a factor of 0.01 per annum to bridge the gap between the v of 
0.55 in 1955 and the n of 0137 in 1960. The scaling down was on the 
grounds that all the known estimates of n (0.55 in 1955, 0.37 in 1968 and 
* A weighted value of the elasticities of demand for the important 
consuming countries. The weights were the percentage of bean 
imported of world total. 
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0.25 in 1974) indicate that n declines with real income per capita 
which has risen with time. 
One other important variable in the calculation, E, was assumed to 
rise by a factor of 0.01 as we go back from 1970 at which time the E 
reported by the UNCTAD committee on commodities was 0.9 (UN Secretariate, 
1973). The justification for this assumption is that over 70 per cent 
of the world's supply of cocoa comes from tropical Africa where supplies 
depend heavily upon the abundance of virgin forests. But since it is 
not unreasonable to suggest that the availability of virgin forest 
suitable for cocoa has progressively declined over the years, it is 
equally reasonable to assume that E has also declined over the period. 
Or, in other words, E rises as one looks back from 1970 to 1947. The 
remaining variables in the calculations, k and ki, have been computed 
from information already given in Appendix l.A, while the percentages 
of the actual taxation and their corresponding case equivalence have 
been adopted from Table 5.3. 
5.4 COMPARISON OF ACTUAL TO OPTIMUM TAX 
We are now in the position to compare the actual withdrawal of 
resources from the Ghana cocoa industry to the theoretical optimum 
withdrawals estimated along the lines suggested by Corden. The 
comparison has been made in three ways: by distribution of class inter-
vals on diagrams of the actual and the theoretical optimum percentage 
withdrawals; by graphs of the two types of percentages, and finally, by 
sums of the withdrawals in their cash equivalence (actual and optimum 
separately), for given periods (e.g., 1947/48 to 1964/65 and 1965/66 to 
1974), expressed as percentages of the total sum of export earnings in 
the corresponding periods. 
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FIGURE 5.7 
DISTRIBUTION CLASS INTERVALS OF EXPORT TAX ON COCOA IN GHANA: 
1947/48-1964/65 
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Source: Calculated from Tables 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. 
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According to the histogram maps (see Figure 5.7), there was a 
concentration of the actual taxation between 45 and 60 per cent for the 
period 1947/48 to 1964/65. But the optimum taxation histogram (B), 
showed that taxation should have concentrated in the 15 to 30 per cent 
range. Although the percentage distributions do not tell precisely 
what quantity of resources have been withdrawn during the period (the 
percentages in Table 5.3 are not additive across periods), one can 
nevertheless suggest that the development of the industry has 
experienced some form of distortion because of the clear difference between 
the ranges of concentration of the actual and the computed optimum taxes 
in the two historgrams. The validity of this suggestion would be 
detracted from by an alte rnative that the computed optimum histogram 
is so removed from the actual because the optimum taxes have been derived 
directly from figures which have been affected by the actual taxes. For 
instance, if the level of taxation of the cocoa industry is tied to a 
sliding scale, as shown in the footnote on page 102, whereby taxes 
decline when world prices decline (a situation of over-supply), and vice 
versa, then the optimum formula would produce the opposite results, for 
optimum taxation rises when production increases and vice versa. However, 
the alternative suggestion requires that world supply and demand for 
cocoa remain constant, but this is shown in column 6 of Appendix l.A 
not to be constant. Therefore, it remains valid that there is a possible 
distortion in the effect of taxation upon the industry. 
By the line graph method (see Figure 5.8), it is revealed that there 
was a disproportionately large actual withdrawal of resources from the 
Ghana cocoa industry between 1947 and 1965. This conclusion arises from 
the fact that less than half the number of actual taxes was below the 
theoretical optimum. Furthermore, by inspection, the total area of the 
actual tax graph is larger than that of the optimum tax. 
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FIGURE 5.8 
REAL TAX, OPTIMUM TAX AND COCOA PRODUCTION IN GHANA, 1947-1965 
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Source: Calculated from column 1 of Table 5.3 and columns 6 and 7 
of Table 5.5. 
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This confirms that the actual taxation exceeded the optimum taxation 
in the period, and so the industry could be said to have been overtaxed. 
Incidentally, when a line graph of the country's annual cocoa production 
was superimposed upon the taxation line graphs, it was observed that 
there existed an inverse relationship between the level of actual 
taxation and the level of production. Production tended to rise in years 
that taxation declined and vice versa. One does not know, however, 
whether it was the rise in taxation which caused production to decline, 
or it was the rise in production which caused taxation to decline; given 
that a rise in production may result in a decline in world prices, which, 
in turn, results in a decline in taxation (if taxation of the industry is 
based on a sliding scale (as explained above in the footnote on page 102). 
The third method of comparison is more precise in stating that the 
Ghana cocoa industry is being overtaxed. The sum of the actual taxes 
between 1947/48 and 1964/65, expressed as a percentage of total sales 
proceeds for the same period, was 36.4 per cent, but the sum of the 
theoretical optimum, as a percentage of the total cocoa export earnings, 
was 24.4 per cent. The disparity (of 12 per cent) is the amount of 
excess taxation of the industry. In money terms, the excess is equal 
to NC265 million, or Ncl5 million per annum during the 1947 to 1965 
period. Similar calculations for the period 1968 to 1973 showed that 
the actual taxation was 47.8 per cent while the optimum taxation was 
30 per cent. This indicates that the excess withdrawal is even probably 
increasing with time. 
5.5 REDUCTION OF TAXATION PROPOSED 
Although it has been established in our discussion that a disparity 
of about 17 per cent between the actual taxation and the theoretical 
optimum taxation currently exists, the proposal for rationalising taxation 
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in the Ghanaian cocoa industry does not imply a reduction in taxation 
by the full amount of 17 per cent. That will not be right because the 
formulation by which the optimum tax is derived is an inverse function 
of the elasticity of demand for Ghana cocoa. But the elasticity of 
demand is, in turn, inversely related to the supply of Ghana cocoa. 
In the final analysis, therefore, a reduction of taxation means an 
increase in the supply of cocoa which results in the decline in the 
elasticity of demand. This, in turn, raises the level of optimum 
taxation. In order to overcome the above problem, it may be useful to 
redraw Figure 5.5 in order to show the relative positions of the actual 
and the optimum taxes, the current corresponding elasticity of demand 
( n * ) and also the direction of movement of the two types of taxes 
towards an equilibrium at E. 
In Figure 5.9, the actual level of taxation is T , while that of A 
the theoretical optimum taxation is T^; JJ and QQ can be assumed to be 
the demand and supply curves respectively, given that they were by 
assumption derived from the demand and supply situation of Ghana cocoa, 
respectively. Thus, at point E, an equilibrium situation has been 
described which, in turn, defines an equilibrium taxation level (T^) on 
the horizontal axis. But as calculated above, T^ and T^ are 47 and 
30 per cent, respectively, for the Ghana cocoa industry in the last 
decade. Thus T lies somewhere between these two. If T is midway E ^ 
between the two then the amount of tax-cut required in the industry to 
bring about equilibrium supply of cocoa is 9 per cent. 
How long it would take for the cut in taxation to effect increases 
in supplies of cocoa to the Board is not precisely determinable. 
However, if increases in supplies were to come from new plantings, it 
would not be substantial before the fourth year (i.e., given that the 
FIGURE 5.9 
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gestation period for cocoa is 4 years or more). But given also that 
positive short-run price elasticities were found by some of the models 
already discussed in Chapter 3, supplies could rise, though not very 
much before the fourth year. In fact, the supply of cocoa to the GCMB 
could experience even a very large jump of about 20 to 30 thousand long 
tonnes per year^ if the reduction in taxation is sufficient to bring 
cocoa prices in Ghana closer towards parity with those in Togo and the 
Ivory Coase (Kumar, 1974), for this could render smuggling oc cocoa 
into those countries unecomlcal to the smugglers. 
From the above discussion, we can redraw Figure 5.5 to show the 
relative locations of the actual to optimum tax rates, and their 
corresponding cocoa output levels for Ghana so that we can reconsider 
the withdrawals from the industry and the GCMB's monopoly power. 
In Figure 5.5 (redrawn) PqP^/OP^ is the actual tax rate for the 
export of Ghana cocoa in the 1947 to 1964 period. This was shown to 
be 36.4 per cent. q^^ M'^ '^ M^ ^^ Corden's optimum tax rate for the same 
period. This was found to be equal to 24.4 per cent. OP and OQ^, then T M 
are the corresponding annual average output levels of cocoa determined 
by the actual and optimum levels of taxation respectively. In real terms 
2 OQ^ is equal to 400,000 tonnes while GQ^ ^ is assumed to be equal to 
3 
600,000 tonnes. P^ is the current world price of cocoa determined by 
free market forces, while P^ ^ is the average price for cocoa guaranteed 
1. Kumar of the University of Ghana has placed a great deal of 
emphasis upon the magnitude and effect of the smuggling of cocoa 
from Ghana. Appendix 5.C shows his estimates of the smuggling. 
The level of smuggling has been increasing alarmingly in recent 
years (at over 30 per cent per annum) and by 19 70/71 was 
estimated to be 86,000 tonnes. 
2. 400,000 tonnes of cocoa is the average annual supply during the 
last decade. 
3. 600,000 tonnes of cocoa is the approximate annual average supply 
quota granted Ghana by the ICA. OQ was assumed to be equal to 
the Agreement's quota to Ghana on the further assumption that the 
figure of 600,000 tonnes was arrived at by taking into account the 
MR-MC conditions of Ghana, as shown in Figure 5.5 (redrawn). 
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by the International Cocoa Agreement (ICA). This price assumes that all 
countries fulfil their quotas. Currently P^ is about 68 US cents per 
pount of cocoa, while P^ ^ is equal to 31 cents, i.e. (28 + 34)/2 where 
28 and 31 are ICA's floor and celling prices, respectively. 
The phenomena illustrated by Figure 5.5 (redrawn) make interesting 
discussion. First of all Figure 5.5 (redrawn) points out that complete 
laissez-faire development of the Ghana cocoa industry would result in 
output levels at Q^ or Z. This, as discussed in the context of Corden's 
argument, will not be optimal in terms of resuorces absorbed and 
profits obtained because although MC = AR at Z, MR is less than MC at 
that point. Thus the existence of the GCMB as a state monopoly is 
justified. 
Secondly, it becomes clear that at the current level of taxation, 
OQ^ (= 400,000) tonnes of cocoa produced annually is not enough for 
* 
Ghana to reap the full benefits of fair market price offered by the 
ICA. By inspection, the area under the demand curve at M is larger than 
any such area defined by any point on the demand curve to the left of M. 
Therefore, benefits would increase if production is moved from T to M. 
This can be achieved by a cut back in taxation of the industry. The 
amount of tax reduction has been discussed already. Admittedly, 
however, the per unit value of cocoa would fall in the face of tax cuts, 
but there is no glory in mere high per unit values at the sacrifice of 
larger aggregate foreign exchange earnings for Ghana. At the current 
level of 400,000 tonnes, Ghana has been losing $US(200,000 x 1500) per 
annum since 1972. But that is not all the loss incurred by holding back 
production at Q^. For Ghana, under Article 10 of the ICA, has the 
* Price is fair because the costs and benefits of producing couiitries 
are assumed to have been adequately accounted for by ICA. 
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largest number of votes, being the largest quota holder (36.7 per cent) 
(UN Treaty Series, 1972), p.10). She is accordingly obliged by Article 
23 of the Agreement to make financial contributions to the administrative 
budget of the Agreement directly proportional to her quota (UN Treaty 
Series, 1972, p.11). Thus, at Ghana's current output level of 27 per 
cent of the world total, she is, indeed, financing ICA's administration 
for the 10 per cent which she does not produce and hence does not derive 
any benefit from. Therefore, not only is Ghana losing $US(200,000 x 1500), 
she is also losing by the payment of 10 per cent of ICA's budget without 
any return. But one other subtle cost which could eventually come about 
if Ghana fails, or refuses to fulfil her quota by persistently resorting 
to short term tax revenue measures, may be that he quota would be 
justifiably reduced by the Agreement and the amount of the reduction 
redistributed among other competitors who are able and willing to produce 
more. This reduction will necessarily affect Ghana's foreign exchange 
» 
earnings from cocoa adversely, given that the increased production by 
her more willing competitors would depress the world price from the 
current level to within the range provided by the ICA. Thus, while the 
price Ghana wanted to keep high is being forcefully depressed, her new 
lower output quota would imply a smaller aggregate income from cocoa 
exports. 
The pros and cons of resource withdrawal from the Ghana cocoa 
industry should, therefore, be judged in relation to what level of 
production is required in any period in order that profits be maximised. 
Or, in other words, on which side of M in Figure 5.5 is the actual 
production level in Ghana. Thus put, the debate on whether to withdraw 
resources or not gives way to that of how much of the resources to 
withdraw in order to leave both farmers and the government at peak 
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benefit levels, i.e., by bringing the level of production to M on the 
world demand curve for Ghana cocoa. 
Bauer and Friedman would be wrong to oppose withdrawals if 
production is to the right of M because any level of output to the 
right of M yields a less than maximum income to Ghana. However, as 
has been shown in Figure 5.5 (redrawn), Ghana's current level of output 
(OQ^), is to the left of M. Therefore, the opponents of withdrawals 
are, to some extent, right. They would be fully right if they argue 
that the withdrawal be reduced by any positive difference that exists 
between the actual and the optimum withdrawal which causes suboptimal 
supply at any given period. The argument of the advocates of withdrawals 
on the other hand, typified by Niculescu that the cocoa farmers give up 
more resources, would be justified also only if the production in a 
period is to the right of M. But it has already been pointed out that 
the current production is to the left of M, and so further withdrawal 
of resources would be 'killing the goose that lays the golden eggs'. 
Corden's caution, that 'though a country could benefit through 
reduction of supply even when the elasticity of demand for her commodity 
is greater than absolute one, but that there would be no benefit if the 
reduction is so much that no trade remains', should be recalled here to 
underline the above argument against Niculescu's suggestion. 
Efforts at export diversification, which began in Ghana in the 1920s, 
have not produced results and will most probably remain unrealised for 
some decades to come. It would, therefore, be to Ghana's greater benefit 
to satisfy the cocoa farmers' economic aspirations by giving them 
remunerative prices for their cocoa, they would, in turn, fulfil Ghana's 
quota of cocoa supply. From this, more of the life-blood of Ghana's 
economic development - foreign exchange - would be earned. 
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The cliche one often comes across in the literature of cocoa in Ghana: 
cocoa farmers did not re-invest (Niculescu, 1954, p. 737), but spent their 
earnings on imported consumer goods and traditional festivities, is no 
longer a valid argument. That unfortunate pattern of expenditure was 
deliberately encouraged by individual European merchants and manufacturers 
in the early days of the cocoa industry in Ghana in order to develop 
markets for European manufactures. In the later years, Britain, both 
for the betterment of her manufacturers and also (in trade between Ghana 
and Britain) to relieve Britain of an embarrassing domestic build-up of 
Ghanaian reserves, also encouraged cocoa farmers to run down these 
reserves on imported goods from Britain. Recent researchers have shown 
that cocoa farmers, after Ghana's independence, without the pressures 
from extraneous sources, do invest their incomes in both cocoa 
production and allied industries, such as transportation, marketing, 
housing, etc. Hill (1972) describes cocoa farmers as being 'creative 
capitalists in the sense of individuals taking the long term view'. 
Applying the concept of the marginal propensity to consume, Ingham 
(1972, p.366) investigated the above quotation concerning the income-
expenditure pattern of the Ghana cocoa farmers, in similar fashion as 
did Shinohara for Japan; Kelley and Williamson for Indonesia; Ranis 
for Pakistan and Friend and Kravis for the USA, and came to the 
conclusion that 'as far as the cocoa farmers' consumption behaviour is 
concerned they are more properly regarded as rural capitalist rather 
than consumption-oriented producers'. 
Making more money available to the cocoa farmers through 
reduction in the direct industry tax would not mean a waste of resources 
with respect to government investment on capital formation in the 
economy. Indeed, the long overdue rural development of Ghana would have 
increased chances of being achieved if the cocoa farmers, who are widely 
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scattered in a large part of the country's rural areas, are given more 
money from the sale of their cocoa. 
The fairly strong conclusions of this thesis nevertheless require a 
note of caution. The analyses have been based partly upon assumptions. 
A particular example of these are those which underly the information 
in Table 5.4. Further research is necessary in order to improve upon 
or confirm their quality and validity before policy decisions can be 
based upon the conclusions of the thesis. 
TABLE 5.2 
RECORD OF THE GHANA COCOA INDUSTRY, 1947-1965 
(XE) (XP) (FP) (PE) 
Crop year 
Total 
production 
Long term 
Total 
sales 
revenue 
NCM 
Average 
selling 
price 
Nc/tonne 
Producer 
price 
Nc/tonne 
Total 
pa3Tnent to 
producers 
NCM 
Payment 
to 
Gov't 
NCM 
GCMB's net 
reserves or 
deficit 
NcM 
19A7/48 207,559 83.0 402.4 149.4 31.0 0.8 48.2 
1948/49 278,372 75.0 273.4 242.6 67.6 3.4 -0.2 
1949/50 247,834 90.0 356.8 168.0 41.6 7.0 36.0 
1950/51 262,223 140.6 537.0 261.3 68.6 26.8 40.2 
1951/52 210,663 103.2 490.2 298.7 63.0 29.4 7.0 
1952/53 246,982 114.2 462.8 261.1 64.4 32.0 12.8 
1953/54 210,693 149.4 717.4 268.8 56.5 68.0 22.2 
1954/55 220,100 155.0 710.2 270.6 59.6 76.8 16.2 
1955/56 228,789 104.6 443.6 298.7 68.4 29.2 1.6 
1956/57 264.375 101.4 379.0 298.5 78.8 24.0 -10.4 
1957/58 206,462 125.8 604.6 268.4 55.4 52.6 13.0 
1958/59 255,484 141.8 561.0 263.8 67.4 52.4 17.0 
1959/60 217,142 139.8 451.0 224.3 71.0 52.6 8.4 
1960/61 432,243 143.2 349.8 224.0 96.8 49.4 -11.6 
1961/62 409,411 138.0 316.8 224.0 82.6 55.0 -20.4 
1962/63 421,736 138.2 328.6 224.0 84.0 55.2 -19.0 
1963/64 421,045 153.8 357.2 224.0 84.8 43.4 6.2 
1964/65 571,722 146.2 225.6 219.3 115.0 33.8 -25.2 
2216.4 444.2 243.9 1256.6 691.8 142.2 
Source: Behrman (1968), Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 50, No.3. 
LO ho 
Source: Berkman (1973). 
NOTES TO TABLE 5.2 
1. Export earnings (XE): 
2. Export price (XP): 
3. Producer price (PP): 
A. Producer earnings (PE): 
5. Tax (all income withheld) (T) 
Total = NC2216.4 million 
Average = NC444.2 
Average = N<:243.9 
Total = NC256.9 million 
Total = NC834.0 million 
Means (X) Standard Deviations (S) Coefficients of Variations (V) 
XE = NC123.13 million 
^XE = 
25.4 
\ E 
= 0.21 
XP = NC444.2 ^XP = 137.3 ^XP = 0.31 
PP = NC243.9 ^PP = 41.4 ^PP = 0.71 
PE = NC 69.8 ^PE = 19.3 ^PE = 0.28 
T = 
V = ^ for there is no trend element in XE, SP, PP and PE in Table 5.3. 
X 
U) OJ 
TABLE 5.3 
DISTRIBUTION OF COCOA INCOME BETWEEN PRODUCERS AND STATE, 1947-1965 
(% sales values) 
Crop year 
% of sales 
revenue to 
producers 
(2) 
% of sales 
revenue to 
government 
(3) 
% of sales 
revenue to 
GCMB 
reserves 
(4) 
% to 
government 
plus GCMB 
reserves 
(5) 
% to 
2+3+4 
(6) 
Difference between 
(2, 3, 4) and 6 
assumed to be cost 
of marketing 
(7) 
1947/48 37.3 1.0 58.1 59.0 96.3 3.7 
1948/49 90.1 5.4 -.3 4.3 94.4 4.6 
1949/50 46.1 7.8 39.9 47.7 93.8 6.2 
1950/51 48.8 19.1 28.6 47.7 96.5 3.5 
1951/52 61.0 28.5 6.8 35.3 96.3 3.7 
1952/53 56.4 28.0 11.2 42.7 99.1 .9 
1953/54 37.9 45.5 14.9 60.4 98.3 1.7 
1954/55 38.5 49.5 10.5 60.0 98.5 1.5 
1955/56 65.4 27.9 1.5 29.4 94.8 5.2 
1956/57 77.7 23.7 -10.0 13.4 91.1 8.9 
1957/58 44.0 41.8 10.3 52.1 96.1 3.9 
1958/59 47.5 37.0 12.0 48.9 96.4 3.6 
1959/60 50.8 37.6 4.4 43.6 94.4 5.6 
1960/61 67.6 34.5 8.1 26.4 94.0 6.0 
1961/62 59.9 39.9 -14.8 25.1 85.0 15.0 
1962/63 60.8 39.9 3.8 29.6 90.7 3.0 
1963/64 55.1 28.2 4.0 32.2 87.3 12.7 
1964/65 78.7 23.1 -17.2 5.9 84.6 15.4 
Source: Behrman (19GG), Journal of Farm Economics, Vol 50, No 3. 
to 
TABLE 5.4 
ACTUAL AND OPTIMAL TAXATION: GHANA COCOA INDUSTRY 
World Rest of Ghana's Other Elasticity Percentage Percentage Optimum Current 
elasticity the world's percentage countries' of demand optimum actual tax on actual 
Crop of demand elasticity share of share of for Ghana tax current Ghana tax on 
year for cocoa of supply world the world cocoa tax cocoa in Ghana 
of cocoa market market (1) cocoa 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
n E ki k ni ti t NcMill. NCMill 
1947/48 -0.55 1.12 35 65 -3.7 27 59.0 22.4 49.0 
1948/49 -0.55 1.11 37 63 -3.4 29 4.3 21.6 3.2 
1949/50 -0.55 1.10 32 68 -4.1 24 47.7 21.6 43.0 
1950/51 -0.55 1.09 34 66 -3.7 27 47.7 38.0 67.0 
1951/52 -0.55 1.08 32 68 -4.0 25 35.3 25.8 36.4 
1952/53 -0.55 1.07 32 68 -4.0 25 42.7 28.6 44.8 
1953/54 -0.55 1.06 29 71 -4.5 22 60.4 32.9 90.2 
1954/55 -0.55 10.5 30 70 -4.3 23 60.4 35.7 93.0 
1955/56 -0.55 1.04 28 72 -4.6 22 29.4 23.0 30.8 
1956/57 -0.52 1.03 30 70 -4.1 24 13.4 24.3 13.6 
1957/58 -0.49 1.02 27 72 -4.6 22 52.1 27.7 65.6 
1958/59 -0.46 1.01 29 71 -4.1 24 48.9 34.0 69.4 
1959/60 -0.43 1.00 31 69 -3.6 28 43.6 39.1 61.0 
1960/61 -0.40 0.99 37 63 -2.8 36 26.4 51.6 37.8 
1961/62 -0. 37 0.98 36 64 -2.8 36 25.1 49.7 34.6 
1962/63 -0.37 0.97 37 63 -2.7 37 29.6 51.1 36.2 
1963/64 -0.37 0.96 35 65 -2.8 36 32.2 55.4 49.6 
1964/65 -0.37 0.95 38 62 -2.5 40 5.9 58.1 8.6 
546.6 834.0 
1965/66 -0.37 0.94 34 66 -2.9 34 
1966/67 -0.37 0.93 28 72 -3.7 27 
1967/68 -0. 37 0.92 31 69 -3.2 31 
1968/69 -0.37 0.91 27 73 -3.8 26 48.3 100.0 
1969/70 -0.25 0.90 29 71 -3.1 32 70.3 113.5 
19 70/71 -0.25 0.89 27 73 -3.3 30 96.6 117.5 
1971/72 -0.25 0.88 30 70 -2.9 34 91.9 109.6 
1972/73 -0.25 0.87 30 70 -2.9 34 89.4 90.5 
1973/74 -0.25 0.86 25 75 -3,6 28 84.0 190.1 
480.5 
Source: Columns (1) and (2) are bv assumotions; colunms (3) and (4) are computed from Appendix l.A; columns (5), (6) 
and (8) are calculated by formula, and columns (7) and (9) are adopted from Table 5.4 for 1947/65, but for 
1968/73 they were calculated from African Development, August 1974. 
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APPENDIX l . A 
WORLD COCOA BEAN PRODUCTION 
(1,000 metric tonnes) 
Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(7 -1 ) Ghana Nigeria Ivory Coast Cameroon Braz i l 
A l l 
Others 
World 
Total 
1. 1919/20 184 30 67 486 302 
2. 1920/21 132 19 2 4 36 182 375 243 
3. 1921/22 140 19 2 4 59 156 389 249 
4, 1922/23 167 35 4 4 57 159 424 257 
5. 1923/24 206 35 4 5 68 162 480 274 
6. 1924/25 232 41 6 5 60 177 521 289 
7. 1925/26 227 49 7 5 72 155 515 288 
8. 1926/27 246 43 10 8 71 115 493 247 
9. 1927/28 216 43 17 7 73 159 514 268 
10. 1928/29 251 54 16 10 64 175 570 354 
11. 1929/30 236 55 22 11 69 152 545 294 
12. 1930/31 244 52 20 11 77 160 564 328 
13. 19 31/32 244 59 31 14 104 135 287 343 
14. 1932/33 260 73 31 17 100 148 629 369 
15. 1933/34 224 73 42 20 108 144 611 387 
16. 1934/35 280 84 44 23 127 171 729 449 
17. 1935/36 290 93 50 24 127 137 721 441 
18. 1936/37 305 103 48 27 119 143 745 440 
19. 1937/38 236 97 53 31 142 165 724 488 
20. 1938/39 300 103 55 28 135 140 761 461 
O 
Appendix l .A (continued): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Year Ghana Nigeria Ivory Coast Cameroon Brazi l 
Al l 
Others 
World 
Total 
(7-1) 
21. 1939/40 246 91 128 672 426 
22. 1940/41 241 103 132 671 430 
23. 1941/42 255 99 109 661 406 
24. 1942/43 211 113 148 600 389 
25. 1943/44 199 75 117 566 367 
26. 1944/45 232 88 120 619 387 
27. 1945/46 213 104 122 627 414 
28. 1946/47 195 113 119 662 467 
29. 1947/48 211 77 97 602 391 
30. 1948/49 283 110 48 45 133 148 767 484 
31. 1949/50 250 103 53 42 153 174 775 525 
32. 1950/51 266 112 57 48 121 171 775 509 
33. 1951/52 214 110 45 55 114 138 676 462 
34. 1952/53 251 111 61 54 137 184 798 547 
35. 1953/54 225 99 53 54 163 187 781 566 
36. 1954/55 238 91 66 56 158 190 799 561 
Appendix l . A ( cont inued) : 
Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(7 -1 ) Ghana Nigeria Ivory Coast Cameroon Braz i l 
A l l 
Others 
World 
Total 
37. 1955/56 233 116 71 54 161 206 841 608 
38. 1956/57 268 137 72 60 165 197 899 631 
39. 1957/58 210 82 45 65 164 203 769 559 
AO. 1958/59 260 143 56 60 178 205 902 642 
41. 1959/60 322 157 62 65 163 165 1040 712 
42. 1960/61 439 197 94 74 156 211 1174 732 
43. 1961/62 416 200 81 75 118 253 1142 721 
44. 1962/63 428 185 103 76 109 268 1173 741 
45. 1963/64 428 220 98 85 121 260 1213 784 
46. 1964/65 580 298 147 87 119 295 1514 1100 
47. 1965/66 416 185 113 76 173 261 1225 809 
48. 1966/67 381 267 150 86 175 287 1345 964 
49. 1967/68 424 238 147 92 144 321 1367 943 
50. 1968/69 339 192 145 104 165 320 1249 910 
51. 1969/70 414 220 181 108 200 1433 
52. 1970/71 406 304 180 112 182 1519 
53. 1971/72 470 256 225 123 164 352 1590 1129 
54. 1972/73 420 241 185 107 159 318 1415 1006 
55. 1973/74 353 215 210 110 203 1410 
4N ho 
Appendix l.A (continued): 
Source: 1. Columns 1, 2 and 7 from 1919-20 - 1951/52, UN FAO Commodity Report: Cocoa Situation Report No.3, 
July 1952 FAO/52/7/4568. 
2. Columns 3, 4 and 5 from 1919/20 - 1962/63 'African Primary Products and International Trade', 
papers delivered at an International Seminar in the University of Edinburgh, September 1964, 
pp.74-82, edited by I.G. Stewart and H.W, Ord, Edinburgh University Press. 
3. All others from 'Cocoa Statistics' by the FAO. 
APPENDIX l.B 
WORLD COCOA SITUATION SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II: PRODUCTION, GRINDINGS AND PRICES 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Year 
World 
Production 
Less 1% 
Grindings Surplus(+) 
Deficit(-) 
Actual 
N.Y Spot 
Accra 
Price/Ib/C 
US General 
Wholesale 
Price Index 
1969 = 100 
Real 
N.Y. Spot 
Accra 
Price/lb/c 
1. 1945/46 621 677 - 56 11.5 19.7 
2. 1946/47 655 658 - 3 34.9 48.6 
3. 1947/48 594 622 - 28 39.7 51.0 
4. 1948/49 759 719 + 40 21.6 29.2 
5. 1949/50 767 795 - 28 32.1 41.8 
6. 1950/51 767 762 + 5 35.5 41.5 
7. 1951/52 668 720 - 52 35.4 42.5 
8. 1952/53 790 800 - 10 37.1 45.2 
9. 1953/54 773 731 + 42 57.8 70.3 
10. 1954/55 791 726 + 65 37.5 45.5 
11. 1955/56 833 820 + 13 27.3 32.1 
12. 1956/57 890 905 - 15 30.6 34.9 
13. 1957/58 761 838 - 17 44.3 49.9 
14. 1958/59 896 860 + 36 36.6 41.1 
15. 1959/60 1030 926 +104 28.4 31.9 
16. 1960/61 1162 1034 +128 22.6 25.5 
17. 1961/62 1131 1119 + 12 21.0 23.6 
18. 1962/63 1161 1151 + 10 25.3 28.5 
19. 1963/64 1201 1197 + 4 23.4 26.3 
20. 1964/65 1499 1345 +154 17.3 19.1 
21. 1965/66 1213 1382 -169 24.4 26.0 
22. 1966/67 1332 1362 - 30 29.1 94.17 30.9 
23. 1967/68 1353 1403 - 50 34.4 96.08 35.8 
24. 1968/69 1236 1340 -104 45.7 100.0 45.7 
25. 1969/70 1419 1354 + 65 34.2 103.5 33.0 
26, 1970/71 1504 1441 + 63 26.8 111.4 25.1 
27. 1971/72 1574 1557 + 17 32.3 126.2 30.0 
28, 1972/73 1401 1539 -138 64.3 151.9 51.0 
29. 1973/74 1396 1504 -108 90.0* 152.1 59.1* 
Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Economics Department Working Paper No.72, >larch 26, 1972 
* These can be estimated. -c-
APPENDIX l.C 
DIRECTION OF GHANA COCOA BEAN TRADE (1949/50 - 1968/69 
(percentages) 
Country 
o i H CNI m m v£) 0 0 ON o rH CM m <3- IT) vO 0 0 ON 
m t o m m m i n LO m LTl i r i vD VD NO vO vC vD vD VD 'X) VO 
o > O i H CM m - J ir, VD CO ON r H r H CM CO m VD 0 0 
m m m i r i u-l m m m m u-i VO VC \ D NO vO vD vC VC NO 
CT\ Ov ON ON ON 0 ^ ON a ^ ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON 
1 i H rH rH 1—1 rH 1—( rH rH rH rH rH rH t H rH rH rH r H rH 
Western Econotaies: 
USA 37.9 37.3 35.4 28.9 21.5 21.5 20.8 17.8 20.7 23.5 21.3 33.1 25.8 21.9 26.4 23.6 17.3 22.2 21.8 30.6 
United Kingdom 26.1 24.8 25.3 25.5 30.5 28.6 17.3 17.6 18.0 15.4 12.5 12.4 12.4 8.9 9.7 5.6 8.4 11.8 12.4 14.1 
Holland 10.2 6.2 6.2 10.5 9.4 13.3 16.6 14.3 14.3 16.4 14.5 13.6 11.8 15.5 10.7 11.5 9.4 6.4 12.7 7.5 
W. Germany 8.7 9.8 10.2 9.5 16.4 17.1 22.6 20.1 26.4 18.0 18.8 16.6 13.9 15.1 14.4 15.1 12.0 8.8 16.1 14.8 
Canada 3.5 2.3 1.6 1.6 0.5 0.4 1.9 1.8 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.6 1.8 0.5 0.8 1.8 0.5 0.9 2.4 2.3 
Sweden 2.2 2.2 1.3 2.2 1.6 1.5 2.2 1.9 0.9 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.1 1.4 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.3 
Belgium 1.7 1.1 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 -
France - 0.8 - - 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.1 0.6 1.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.3 
Italy - - - 1.6 0.8 1.3 2.3 2.3 5.7 6.6 4.6 3.8 2.7 4.4 3.7 2.0 2.3 1.5 2.4 1.6 
Japan - - - - - - - - - 0.4 0.9 2.0 2.8 4.0 5.0 3.0 7.1 7.0 5.4 6.6 
Australia 1.7 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.2 2.6 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.4 2.0 1.5 2.1 1.3 
New Zealand 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.6 - 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.6 
Denmark 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.6 
Norway 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.3 
Eire 1.7 0.4 - 1.4 1.0 1.5 1.3 0.5 1.6 0.7 1.0 0.6 1.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.5 2.7 1.2 2.3 
SUB-TOTALS 94.4 87.7 84.0 83.3 86.0 90.8 92.7 83.1 94.5 90.6 82.6 90.3 80.0 75.9 76.7 69.0 64.6 68.2 81.0 85.2 
U i 
Appendix l.C (continued): 
Country 
o irl CM LO 00 ON o .H CN m <r 
lO vO 00 VD ON u-1 ITI LO U-1 m m m lO m vO vO vC v£> vD vD vC 
CTN <3-CTN 1-H 
O LO r-H CNI -vl- m CO ON O iH CN m 
lO 00 
Ov U-1 in m in LO LO lO lO LO VD v£> vO vO vO vO vD 
1—1 CTN ON ON ON ON ON 0^  ON ON ON ON ON ON 
ON ON ON iH rH T-l 1—1 iH .H I—1 iH 1-* iH .H rH iH 1—1 1—1 1—1 I H 1—i 
Eastern Economies; 
USSR 1.2 6.6 5.6 6.6 7.5 5.9 5.3 14.9 - 3.4 12.6 1.8 8.4 13.3 8.3 13.3 14.0 17.3 8.5 4.9 
China - - - - - - - - - 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.2 1.1 2.0 - - - -
Czechoslovakia - - - - - - - - 0.2 - 0.1 1.0 1.2 - 2.6 3.5 1.2 1.2 0.9 
East Germany - - - - - - - - - 0.7 8.4 1.3 1.6 1.1 1.2 3.5 1.8 0.3 -
Yugoslavia - - - - - - - - 0.1 0.4 1.0 1.5 3.2 2.2 4.8 3.0 3.0 5.1 4.2 
Poland - - - - - - - - - - 0.6 1.7 2.5 2.3 3.2 2.3 4.5 1.2 0.6 
Hungary - - - - - - - - - - - 1.0 - - 1.0 1.0 0.6 - 0.3 
Bulgaria 3.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.3 
SUB-TOTALS 1.2 6.6 5.6 6.6 7.5 5.9 5.3 14.9 - 3.7 14.5 7.7 16.1 22.1 15.7 29.1 28.3 29.0 16.6 11.2 
OTHERS 4.4 5.7 10.4 8.1 6.5 3.3 2.0 2.0 5.5 5.7 2.9 2.0 3.9 2.0 7.6 1.9 7.1 2.8 2.4 3.6 
GRAND TOTAL s= 100% 
Cocoa Beans lO o LO 00 LO VO m CN iH ro VD o VO .H CN o o o o o in • r> • . . • • • . • • . • • r- CN o o ON 00 n VO lO VO o 00 00 LO rH 00 cr^  rn 1000's long tonnes ^ iH .H iH CN VD o LO iH cn o iH m C3N ON CN CN o CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN m <3- o- cn ro ro ro 
Source: Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board Report 30 September 1959, and 28 February 1965, and Economic Survey of Ghana, 1969, 
iA/ 
APPENDIX l.D 
BASIC QUOTAS UNDER PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE 30 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COCOA AGREEMENT 
Exporting Country Production ('000 tonnes) 
Basic Quota 
Percentages 
Ghana 580.9 36.7 
Nigeria 307.8 19.7 
Ivory Coast 224.0 14.2 
Brazil 200.6 12.7 
Cameroon 126.0 8.0 
Dominican Republic 47.0 3.0 
Equatorial Guinea 38.7 2.4 
Togo 28.0 1.8 
Mexico 27.0 1.7 
TOTAL 1,580.0 100.0 
Source; International Cocoa Agreement 1972, Geneva, 20 October 1972, 
Because of the high percentage quota given to Ghana, she enjoys a 
voting power of 300 out of the total votes of 1,000. 
APPENDIX 2.A 
ESTIMATED PLANTATION DEVELOPMENT FROM VIRGIN BUSH FOR COCOA, RUBBER, OIL PALM AND BANANAS 
(Agricultural Operation Only) 
M A N D A Y S P E R C R O P 
DEVELOPMENT COCOA Stake Basket 
Planting Planting 
RUBBER 
Seedling Bud 
Trees Grafts 
OIL PALM BANANAS 
Survey (initial prospecting) 
Brushing, felling and lopping 
Lining and holding 
Clearing, planting lines and paths 
Nurseries 
Planting 
Cover crops 
Thinning out forest shade 
Additional costs for building 
Draining of field 
Mulching 
Sundry labour 
Sub-total days 
2 
6 
14 
18 
8i 
n 
54 
2 
6 
14 
18 
18 
8^ 
68 
2 
45 
10 
45 
12 
6 
3 
8 
131 
2 
45 
10 
45 
7 
6 
3 
2 
45 
8 
23 
22 
8 
3 
132 
9 
120 
2 
45 
14 
12 
14 
3 
90 
MAINTENANCE TO BEARING AGE: 
General weeding 
Pruning 
Replacement 
Upkeep of paths 
Control of pests and diseases 
Nurseries 
Sundry labour 
Progressive thinning out of forest shade 
Fertilising 
Sub-total days 
TOTAL DAYS 
P E R C R O P P E R 
12 
li 
2 
12 
21 X 4yrs 21 x 4 yrs 
=84 =84 
138 152 
13 
2 
3 
2 
4 
13 
2 
3 
2 
4 
25 X 5 yrs 25 x 6 yrs 
=125 =150 
256 282 
A N N U M 
5 
3 
3 
2 
2 
5 
20 X 4 yrs 
=80 
200 
14 
2 
Source: Cocoa by D.H. Urquhart, 1955, Longman's, Green and Co., London. 
17 X 1 yr 
=70 
107 
OC 
149 
APPENDIX 2.B 
PLANTS PER ACRE AT DIFFERENT SPACING 
Planting distance Acre for each plant Number of plants 
in feet in square feet per acre 
4 X 4 16 2,722 
5 X 5 25 1,742 
6 X 6 36 1,210 
7 X 7 49 889 
8 X 8 64 680 
9 X 9 81 537 
10 X 10 100 435 
11 X 11 121 360 
12 X 12 144 302 
13 X 13 169 257 
14 X 14 196 222 
15 X 15 225 139 
16 X 16 256 170 
17 X 17 289 150 
18 X 18 324 134 
Source; Cocoa by Urquhart, p.202. 
APPENDIX 3.A 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR REGIONAL SUPPLY FUNCTION FOR GHANA COCOA: 1946-62 AND 1949-62 
Region Constant Cocoa Price^ Coffee . 2 Price Rainfall Humidity Se d.f.5 
^ - s ^t-k 
1946 
C 
t-s 
- 1962 Central -10.820 
(7.04) 
.129^ ^ 
(.060) 
.151^ 
(.054) 
-.137^ 
(.186) 
-.021 
(.202) 
.828^ 
(.305) 
-.820 
(.613) 
.792^ ^ 6.242 10 
-14.854 
(3.90) 
.100^ 
(.037) 
.151^ 
(.045) 
.931® 
(.290) 
.740^ 6.121 13 
Western - 4.498 
(2.45) 
.069^ 
(.020) 
.058^ 
(.019) 
-.200^ 
(.066) 
.133^ ^ 
(.069) 
.430^ ^ 
(.198) 
.006 
(.085) 
.797" 2.030 10 
- 1.49 
(1.57) 
.058® 
(.019) 
.069® 
(.017) 
-.170^ 
(.063) 
-327® 
(.192) 
.742" 2.087 12 
Volta - 1.455 
(2.27) 
.093® 
(.019) 
.081® 
(.017) 
-.353® 
(.059) 
.104^ 
(.067) 
.604® 
(.140) 
-.069^ 
(.063) 
.898® 1.975 10 
1.692 
(1.38) 
.097® 
(.018) 
.101® 
(.015) 
.377® 
(.057) 
.576® 
(.125) 
-.290^ ^ 
(.138) 
.892® 1.835 11 
Eastern .603 
(5.97) 
.022 
(.057) 
.237® 
(.041) 
-.029 
(.196) 
-.485^ 
(.160) 
.889^ 
(.359) 
-.988^ 
(.439) 
.852® 4.917 10 
1.522 
(4.925) 
.240® 
(.036) 
-.501® 
(.140) 
.923® 
(.254) 
-.990^ 
(.404) 
.848® 4.550 12 
o 
Appendix 3.A (continued): 
Region Constant Cocoa Price^ Coffee Price^ Rainfall Humidity R2 Se d.f.^ 
P t-s ^t-k 
1949 
P 
t-s 
- 1962 Old Ashanti 14.273 
(14.03) 
.157^ 
(.111) 
.392^ 
(.089) 
-.148 
(.424) 
-1.183^ 
(.587) 
1.967^ 
(.748) 
-1.989^^ 
(.762) 
.904^ 9.546 7 
14.688 
(12.895) 
.124^ 
(.056) 
.390^ 
(.084) 
-1.321^ 
(.410) 
1.967^ 
(.684) 
-2.059^ 
(.694) 
.902^ 9.007 8 
Sunyani 19.790 
(20.571) 
.166^ 
(.071) 
.187^ ^ 
(.087) 
-.365^^ 
(.245) 
.855^ 
(.605) 
1.618^ 
(.586) 
-4.305^^ 
(1.749) 
.783^ 5.780 7 
-2.949 
(1.45) 
.078^ ^ 
(.030) 
.715^ 
(.355) 
.548 3.869 10 
Source: Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.47 , 1965, pp .94-95. 
Mote: Significance levels: 
a = .01; b = .02; c = .05; d = .10; e = .25; f = .50. 
1. The variable P , represents the real producer price of cocoa lagged 8 years in each region; the variable L K. 
represents every region except Sunyani and Goaso where the value of s is 13 and 10 respectively. 
2. The lag structure of coffee prices is identical with the lag in cocoa prices. 
3. d.f. represents degrees of freedom. 
The first set of information for each area contains estimates for all the variables listed in equation 9. 
The second set eliminates those coefficients which were not significant. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard effors for each of the prospective coefficients. 
APPENDIX 3.B 
AGGREGATE SUPPLY FUNCTIONS FOR GHANA 
Region Constant Cocoa Price Coffee Price Rainfall Se d.f. F1 F2 
P t-s ^t-k C t-s 
Volta 
& 
Central & 
4.036 
(7.72) (.068) 
.120® 
(.082) 
.989® 
(.719) 
.18 19.405 8.30 70.05 
Sunyani .121^ 
(.017) 
.133^ 
(.021) 
.793^ 
(.181) 
.77^ 4.886 6.30 1.24 
Volta f 
-.219 
(1.111) 
.069^ 
(.013) 
.081^ 
(.012) 
-.239^ 
(.042) 
.420^ 
(.113) 
.76^ 2.116 5.24 1.18 
Cx 
Western .069^ 
(.013) 
.081^ 
(.012) 
-.239^ 
(.042) 
.420^ 
(.113) 
.76^ 2.115 4.24 1.47 
Source: Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 47, 1965, p.398. 
Note: Significance levels are the same as in Appendix 3.A, p, .151. 
Ul ho 
APPENDIX 3.C 
YEARS AFTER PLANTING IN WHICH COCOA YIELD PER UNIT OF PLANTED AREA APPARENTLY INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY 
Country "l 
Qiana 8 12 
Nigeria 8 12 
Ivory Coast 9 14 
Cameroon 10 -
Brazil 6 12 
Equador 8 14 
Dominican Republic 7 13 
Venezuela 6 9 
Source: Behnnan (1968), Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.50, No.3. 
Ln 
U> 
APPENDIX 3.D 
LEAST-SQUARES ESTIMATES OF COCOA SUPPLY RESPONSE MODEL FOR EIGHT LEADING COCOA PRODUCING COUNTRIES 
1947/48 - 1963/64 
Country APC^ APC^.3 APC t-ni APC t-n2 APCF t-n^ APCF t-n2 Constant 
Ghana 0.267 
(0.19) 
0.410 
(0.34) 
0.970 
(0.28) 
5.20 
(9.2) 
0.44 
Nigeria -0.474 
(0.23) 
-0.249 
(0.22) 
0.307 
(0.30) 
0.503 
(0.23) 
8.17 
(6.1) 
0.36 
Ivory 
Coast 
-0.556 
(0.19) 
0.234 
(0.19) 
1.04 
(0.28) 
1.13 
(0.33) 
-0.617 
(0.38) 
3.88 
(2.7) 
0.63 
Cameroon -0.538 
(0.15) 
0.084 0.119 
(0.063)(0.061) 
0.332 
(0.069) 
3.27 
(0.76) 
0.70 
Brazil -0.237 
(0.26) 
-0.202 
(0.24) 
1.27 
(1.12) 
0.564 
(0.80) 
0.199 
(0.92) 
1.59 
(0.95) 
1.35 
(1.5) 
-1.69 
(9.2) 
0.36 
Equador -0.721 
(0.19) 
0.143 
(0.096) 
0.339 
(0.13) 
-0.289 
(1.14) 
-0.295 
(1.18) 
2.82 
(0.97) 
0.54 
Dominican 
Republic 
-1.08 
(0.26) 
-9.576 
(0.31) 
0.0918 
(0.11) 
0.119 
(0.13) 
0.234 
(0.133) 
-0.164 
(0.14) 
-0.292 
(0.17) 
2.30 
(0.91) 
0.61 
Venezuela -0.849 
(0.23) 
0.0711 0.0619 
(0.053)(0.057) 
0.0553 
(0.0503) 
0.237 
(0.085) 
-0.684 
(0.68) 
-0.197 
(0.090) 
0.630 
(0.482) 
0.50 
Source: Behrman (1968), Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.50, No.3. 
l-n 
APPENDIX 5.A 
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR RAW COCOA: 1968-70 
Consumption of cocoa in 
bean equivalents 
Elasticity of consumption per 
head with respect to -
Country 
Per head 
Proportion 
of world 
total 
Income 
per 
head 
Cocoa 
price 
Cocoa price 
weighted 
with (2) 
(1) 
kg 
(2) % (3) (4) (5) 
United States 1.8 26.7 - -0.25 
Germany F. Rep. 2.6 11.4 0.93 -0.18 
United Kingdom 2.2 8.9 0.71 -0.16 
France 1.6 5.9 0.68 -0.38 
Canada 2.0 2.8 0.72 -0.19 
Spain 1.0 2.A 0.85 -0.24 
Italy 0.6 2.2 0.93 -0.21 
Netherlands 1.3 1.3 0.62 -0.89 
Rest of World - 38.4 - -0.25 
WORLD ELASTICITY OF DEMAND 0.25 
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat Report : Committee on Commodities , 27/2/73, p.14. 
Ln 
Appendix 5.A (continued): 
Country 
Proportion of 
world cocoa 
production 
Price elasticity of supply Total Elasticity weighted 
with (1) Short run Long run elasticity 
(1) % (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ghana 27.9 - 0.71 0.71 0.200 
Nigeria 17.4 - 0.45 0.45 0.078 
Brazil 12.8 0.53 0.95 1.48 0.189 
Ivory Coast 13.0 - 0.80 0.80 0.104 
Cameroon 7.7 0.68 1.81 2.49 0.192 
Equador 3.9 - 0.28 0.28 0.011 
Dominican 
Republic 2.7 0.03 0.15 1.18 0.034 
Venezuela 1.3 0.12 0.38 0.50 0.006 
Rest of World 13.3 - 2.00* 2.00* 0.262 
WORLD ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY -1.100 
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat Report: Committee on Commodities, 27/2/73, p.14. Ln 
a\ 
APPENDIX 5.B 
AGGREGATE INCOMES OF COCOA PRODUCERS: NET OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND COMPULSORY SAVINGS 
Year Money incomes Real income (1958/59 = 100) Index of real income 
1958/59 65.5 68.5 100.0 
1959/60 71.0 68.0 99.3 
1960/61 97.0 86.1 125.7 
1961/62 82.7 70.1 103.2 
1962/63 85.1 65.1 95.0 
1963/64 81.6 52.6 76.8 
1964/65 104.0 50.9 74.3 
1965/66 61.2 30.5 44.5 
1966/67 63.9 34.4 50.2 
1967/68 100.9 49.4 72.1 
1968/69 88.5 39.8 58.1 
1969/70 122.2 52.9 77.0 
1970/71 122.5 51.9 75.8 
Source: Cocoa in the Ghana Economy by J.E.A. Manu. 
Ln 
APPENDIX 5.C 
SMUGGLING OF COCOA BEANS BETWEEN GHANA AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, 1959/60 - 1970/71 
Season C O U N T R Y 
Ghana Ivory Coast Togo 
1959/60 + 6.6650 - 5.9350 -0.7360 
1960/61 + 1.5910 - 0.4900 -1.5349 
1961/62 + 7.4570 - 5.8230 -1.6288 
1962/63 - 6.1960 + 8.6444 -2.9336 
1962/64 - 2.6255 +22.3945 +0.2392 
1964/65 -19.5550 +20.6650 -1.0880 
1965/66 -19.8025 +18.2975 +1.5160 
1966/67 -56.225 +53.7750 +2.440 
1967/68 -47.6925 +44.2025 +3.848 
1968/69 -62.1425 +56.5575 +5.572 
1969/70 -79.7080 +72.6162 +7.1072 
1970/71 -86.7475 +74.1525 +12.6040 
'Smuggling in Ghana: Its Magnitude and Income Effect' by Ashok Kumar, 
The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol.15, No.2, 1973, 
Source; 
Note: Positive figures imply a net inflow of cocoa from another country. 
Negative figures imply a net outflow of cocoa to other countries. 
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